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INTRODUCTION
At 5:12 a.m. on Wednesday, April 18, 1906, “a deafening rumble filled
the air” in San Francisco as “buildings swayed” and then crumbled to the
ground.1 A massive earthquake had struck, but the real catastrophe was still to
come.2 The earthquake caused gas-fed fires to erupt, which were magnified by
the fire department’s ill-fated attempts to stop the spreading blaze by using
dynamite to create areas where the fire could not pass, which are known as
firebreaks.3 With water mains broken, firefighters could not stop the inferno,
and the largest city west of the Mississippi River was destroyed in three days.4
Thousands of people were killed and most of the residents were left homeless.5
The damage caused by the earthquake and fire cost billions in today’s dollars.6
At that time, most property policies in the U.S. covered losses caused by
fire, but also contained an “anti-concurrent causation”7 exclusion that barred
coverage for losses caused “directly or indirectly” by earthquakes.8 Not surpris-
ingly, when the massive loss claims were presented, many insurers refused to
pay. They argued the losses were not covered because the earthquake set in
1 James S. Harrington, Lessons of the San Francisco Earthquake of 1906: Understanding
Ensuing Loss in Property Insurance, 37 THE BRIEF: TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. SEC., Summer
2008, at 28.
2 Id.
3 See id.; see also Firebreak, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.mer-
riam-webster.com/dictionary/firebreak (last visited Jan. 20, 2013).
4 Harrington, supra note 1, at 28; see also PATRICIA GROSSI & ROBERT MUIR-WOOD, THE
1906 SAN FRANCISCO EARTHQUAKE AND FIRE: PERSPECTIVES ON A MODERN SUPER CAT 4
(Irene Fehr ed., 2006).
5 See GROSSI & MUIR-WOOD, supra note 4, at 4; Harrington, supra note 1, at 28.
6 GROSSI & MUIR-WOOD, supra note 4, at 4 n.1.
7 “Concurrent causation” is a phrase used to cover a number of situations in which a loss is
caused by multiple perils. Typically, one or more of the perils is excluded from coverage.
Although the term “concurrent” implies a temporal simultaneity, the term has been used by
courts and commentators to include (1) sequential causes in a causal chain of events; (2)
independent, unrelated events acting in conjunction; and (3) related or unrelated events that
happen in succession. See Mark M. Bell, A Concurrent Mess and a Call for Clarity in First-
Party Property Insurance Coverage Analysis, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 73, 74 (2011). Although
much has been written regarding concurrent causation when an ensuing loss clause is not at
issue, this Article does not address concurrent causation disputes in situations where an ensu-
ing loss clause is not in play. See infra p. 130 and notes 163–66.
8 Harrington, supra note 1, at 28.
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motion the chain of events that led to the fires and destruction.9 The highest
courts that heard the cases, the Supreme Court of California10 and the Ninth
Circuit,11 held the losses were covered notwithstanding the anti-concurrent cau-
sation language contained in the earthquake exclusion.
In the wake of these decisions, the California legislature enacted a set of
statutes designed to prevent insurers from disclaiming coverage for fire damage
that followed an earthquake.12 In response, insurers created a policy provision
known as the “ensuing loss” clause, which specified that losses that follow both
an earthquake and a fire are covered even if the policy excludes coverage for
losses caused by earthquakes.13 As the coverage provided under property insur-
ance was expanded to cover losses caused by other perils in addition to fire,
broader versions of the ensuing loss clause were adopted to encompass all cov-
ered perils even though such policies also often contain anti-concurrent causa-
tion exclusions. Thus, although originally created for the specific context of
earthquakes and fires, the ensuing loss clause came to ensure that losses caused
at least in part by a covered peril remain covered under property policies even
if an excluded peril also played a role in causing the loss. Stated differently, for
many losses, the ensuing loss clause is an antidote to anti-concurrent causation
exclusions.
Despite its potential application in many situations, the clause has been
largely ignored and generally misunderstood ever since it was created.14 This
Article explains the clause’s history, purpose, and relevance in light of the
recent attention in insurance law to concurrent causation and anti-concurrent
causation exclusions in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.15
Today, the ensuing loss clause is found in various types of property poli-
cies such as “all risk” and homeowners policies that also contain anti-concur-
rent causation exclusions.16 It has various iterations,17 each drafted by
9 See Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co. v. Willard, 164 F. 404, 405 (9th Cir. 1908); Pac.
Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 111 P. 4, 4 (Cal. 1910).
Lloyd’s of London, however, famously agreed to pay the claims. Harrington, supra note 1,
at 36 n.3 (“Lloyd’s leading nonmarine underwriter Cuthbert Heath cabled the following terse
instruction to his San Francisco agent after the news of the catastrophe reached London: ‘Pay
all of our policyholders in full irrespective of the terms of their policies.’ ”).
10 Pac. Heating & Ventilating Co., 111 P. at 4, 7.
11 Willard, 164 F. at 404, 409.
12 See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 2081, 10088, 10088.5 (West 2005).
13 See INT’L RISK MGMT. INST., INC., COMMERCIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE § IV.J.38 (2011).
14 See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
15 See infra note 170.
16 “All risk” policies are intended to provide the broadest property insurance available to
policyholders and cover all risks except for specific risks or perils expressly listed. See, e.g.,
Jeff Katofsky, Subsiding Away: Can California Homeowners Recover from Their Insurer for
Subsidence Damages to Their Homes?, 20 PAC. L.J. 783, 785 (1989) (“In an ‘all-risk’ pol-
icy, all losses except those specifically excluded are covered. This is the broadest form of
coverage and has been so interpreted by the courts.”). “All risk” policies evolved from
“named peril” policies. Historically, “named peril” policies covered one specified peril. The
earliest non-marine named peril policy reportedly was a fire policy, which originated in
London following the Great Fire of 1666. See PETER J. KALIS, THOMAS M. REITER & JAMES
R. SEGERDAHL, POLICYHOLDER’S GUIDE TO THE LAW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE
§ 13.02[A][1] (1st ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) (citing RANDOLPH FIELDS, FINDING LOST TREA-
SURE—HISTORICAL REVIEW OF FIRST PARTY PROPERTY POLICIES 3 (1991)). In the 1940s and
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insurers.18 One common version found in “all risk” property policies provides:
“This policy does not insure loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any
Peril excluded . . . [such as] faulty workmanship or faulty materials, unless loss
or damage from an insured Peril ensues and then only for such ensuing loss or
damage.”19 Notably, the terms “ensues,” “ensuing loss,” and “peril” are not
defined.20
Another common version of the ensuing loss clause provides: “We insure
for all risks of physical loss to the property described in Coverage A except for
loss caused by . . . [any of the 6 following excluded causes of loss]. . . . Any
1950s, insurers began to bundle coverage of certain named perils together under one policy.
These policies became known as “multi-peril” policies. Under “named peril” or “multi-peril”
policies, any perils that were not expressly listed were excluded. Id. § 13.02[A]. “All risk”
policies were then developed from “multi-peril” policies. Id. § 13.02[B]. Unlike “multi-
peril” policies, however, “all risk” policies cover all perils unless a peril is specifically
excluded. See 5 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE
WITH FORMS § 3092 (4th prtg., rev. vol. 1987); 3 NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE
GUIDE § 31.06[2][d] (Jeffrey E. Thomas et al. eds., 2011); 10A LEE R. RUSS & THOMAS F.
SEGALLA, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 148:50 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter COUCH ON
INSURANCE] .
17 See, e.g., Daniel Schwarcz, Reevaluating Standardized Insurance Policies, 78 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1263, 1277–1314 (2011) (discussing the various versions of homeowners policies used
by insurers).
18 See, e.g., Wagner v. Yates, 912 N.E.2d 805, 811 (Ind. 2009) (“[T]he insurer drafts the
policy and foists its terms upon the customer.”); 401 Fourth Street, Inc. v. Investors Ins.
Grp., 879 A.2d 166, 171 (Pa. 2005) (noting that “the insurer drafts the policy, and controls
coverage”). See also Michelle Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language
Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2010) (describing the “hyperstandardization” of
insurance policies); Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J.
107, 125 (2008) (“[I]n some lines of insurance, all insurance companies provide identical
coverage on the same take-it-or-leave-it basis.”); 1 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON
INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 4.06[B] (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CON-
TRACTS]  (“In a sense, the typical insurance contract is one of ‘super-adhesion’ in that the
contract is completely standardized and not even reviewed prior to contract formation.”);
Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531,
534 (1996); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945:
Reconceiving the Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 18 (1993);
James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of Interpretation?:
Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 996 (1992) (“The only part of the standard
policy that is generally customized to the consumer-insured is the Declaration
Sheet, . . . there is little, if any, freedom to negotiate the standardized language of the insur-
ance contract that determines the scope of coverage.”); Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle,
76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1153 (1990) (“[P]roperty owner’s liability insurance contracts are
standardized across insurers in a form few insureds have the power or experience to bargain
around.”).
19 Blaine Constr. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1999). See also
cases cited infra notes 56, 80, and 103.
20 “Ensue” commonly is understood to mean “to follow.” See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERI-
TAGE DICTIONARY 613 (3d ed. 1996). “Peril,” according to Black’s Law Dictionary, is “[t]he
risk, hazard, or contingency insured against by a policy of insurance. In general, the cause of
any loss such as may be caused by fire, hail, etc.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1138 (6th ed.
1990). “Perils” also have been described by one court as “fortuitous, active, physical forces
such as lightning, wind, and explosion, which bring about the loss.” Garvey v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989).
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ensuing loss from items 1 through 6 not excluded is covered.”21 Again, “ensu-
ing loss” is not defined.
To put the clause and how it becomes an issue in context, consider the
following scenario, which occurs daily throughout America. A homeowner’s
roof leaks and the intruding rainwater causes damage to the walls, floor, and
other parts of the interior of the house.22 The homeowner submits a claim to the
insurer of the house and the insurer sends a claims adjuster to the house to
investigate the claim. The investigator concludes the leak was due to the
improper installation of the roof. The insurer then denies coverage for the claim
by pointing to the anti-concurrent causation language and arguing that “faulty
workmanship,” which is an excluded peril, “directly or indirectly” caused the
loss. Insurers, such as the one in this example, attempt to avoid coverage by
framing the issue as a question of whether an excluded peril had a role in
causing the damage. If an excluded peril did have a role, then the insurers
contend the loss is not covered.
Yet, when the ensuing loss clause is in play, whether an excluded peril had
a role in causing the damage should not be determinative. If it were, then the
ensuing loss clause, which appears in the exclusions themselves, would be
superfluous because it would be overridden in every case in which an excluded
peril played any role in causing the loss. Such a result is contrary to the way the
ensuing loss clause is intended to operate. The clause is intended to preserve
coverage for losses caused, in part, by an excluded peril if a loss follows (or
“ensues”) from a covered peril. Indeed, the very purpose of the ensuing loss
clause is to clarify that the exclusions should not swallow the basic coverage
provided by the policy.
In the leaking roof example, of course the negligent installation of the roof
played a role in the chain of events that led to the damage. The homeowner’s
claim, however, is for the rainwater damage to the interior of the house, not the
costs to repair the roof. It is undeniable that the water damage ensued from a
covered peril—rain. Thus, when applying the ensuing loss clause, the real
question is whether a loss “ensued from,” meaning “followed,” a covered peril.
If it did, then the claim should be covered regardless of whether excluded perils
were also involved in causing the loss because the loss or damage ensued from,
at least in part, a covered peril.
Such a conclusion is also dictated by the doctrine of contra proferentem.23
As currently worded, the ensuing loss clause is confusing and contradictory.
21 Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Ariz. 1985) (emphasis
omitted). See also cases cited infra notes 56, 80, and 103.
22 It is not unusual for a loss to be caused by multiple perils. See, e.g., Campbell v. Ins.
Serv. Agency, 424 N.W.2d 785, 789–90 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (listing eight possible causes
implicated in the loss: “storms, ice, rain, flying rocks, a high [lake] water level, wind, waves
and faulty shutters”); Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383
N.W.2d 645, 648 (Minn. 1986) (noting eight possible causes of a wall collapse: negligent
backfilling, crane vibrations, pressure from trucks, concrete truck vibrations, vibration
caused by a subcontractor, pressure from a dirt pile, rain, and wall construction of concrete
block instead of poured concrete).
23 As is discussed more fully below in Part II.A., contra proferentem is the contract inter-
pretation rule that provides that ambiguities in contractual language should be construed
against the drafter of the language. The insurers are the drafters of ensuing loss clauses.
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How can a loss that is caused “directly or indirectly” by certain perils be
excluded from coverage under the exclusionary language but simultaneously be
covered if the loss nonetheless ensues from a non-excluded peril? According to
insurers, the words “directly or indirectly” in the first part of the clause encom-
pass all losses that are caused in any way by an excluded peril regardless of
whether or not a loss nonetheless ensues from a covered peril. Consequently,
insurers argue that if the “directly or indirectly” exclusionary language were
not intended to apply, then what would be the point of the exclusion? The
clause also provides, however, that if a loss ensues from a covered peril despite
being indirectly or directly caused by an excluded peril, then the loss is cov-
ered. What does it mean for a loss to ensue from a covered peril? Although,
“ensue” and “ensuing loss” are not defined in the policies, “ensue” commonly
is understood simply to mean to take place subsequently.24 Thus, one reasona-
ble interpretation of the clause is that any time a loss follows a covered peril,
then the loss is covered. Another reasonable interpretation is that any time a
loss follows a covered peril, then the loss is covered even if an excluded peril is
also involved in causing the loss. When there are multiple interpretations of
policy language that are reasonable, the language is ambiguous and thus, it
should be construed in favor of coverage under the doctrine of contra
proferentem.25
Other policy interpretation rules, such as the “reasonable expectations”
doctrine and construction of the policy as a whole, also dictate that the ensuing
loss clause should be interpreted in a way that results in coverage for many
losses, such as the rainwater damage in the above example. When a homeowner
purchases an “all risk” homeowners policy, the homeowner reasonably expects
that losses caused by perils such as rain will be covered. Indeed, in the above
example, because rainwater damage is one of the common risks for which a
homeowner seeks coverage when he or she buys a homeowners policy, the
homeowner reasonably expects such damage will be covered regardless of
whether the rainwater damage also was caused, in part, by faulty workmanship
or some other excluded peril. Consequently, when the policy language is inter-
preted with the primary purpose of homeowners insurance in mind, the policy-
holder’s reasonable expectation that rainwater damage will be covered should
be fulfilled.26
Remarkably, the ensuing loss clause is often completely overlooked in
concurrent causation coverage disputes even though the clause may preserve
coverage for many claims that are otherwise excluded under an anti-concurrent
causation exclusion. In addition, in cases where the clause has been considered,
it has confused and divided the courts. Although many courts have reached the
correct result when they interpreted and applied the ensuing loss clause, some
of them have done so for the wrong reasons.27 Other courts have reached the
wrong result when interpreting and applying the clause because they have
either misunderstood the clause or failed to correctly apply the insurance policy
24 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
25 See discussion infra Parts II.A, V.
26 See discussion infra Parts II.B–C.
27 See discussion infra Part III.
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interpretation rules to the clause.28 For example, some courts have gone astray
in their analysis by adopting some insurers’ argument that a “separate and inter-
vening” covered peril, unrelated to an excluded peril, must occur after the
excluded peril in the causation chain of events in order for the loss to be cov-
ered.29 Other courts mistakenly have applied the tort concept of “efficient prox-
imate cause” to the analysis and reframed the issue as a question of whether the
“initial” event in the causation chain of events that caused the loss was covered
or excluded.30 Such approaches are not consistent with the language of the
ensuing loss clause or the rules of policy interpretation.
Indeed, the words “separate” and “intervening” do not appear in the ensu-
ing loss clause. Nor does the language in the ensuing loss clause, or insurance
law generally, support applying tort concepts such as “efficient proximate
cause” to the analysis. One of the reasons tort law is inapplicable is because it
is driven by assignment of blame to parties and analysis of parties’ duties of
care, neither of which is relevant to interpreting and applying insurance policy
language.31 Whether a policy covers a loss is a question of contract interpreta-
tion, not an exercise in assigning blame.
Moreover, tort concepts such as “efficient proximate cause” are malleable
and lead to metaphysical arguments regarding which “cause” in a long causa-
tion chain of events was the most important cause of the loss or which “cause”
started the causation chain that led to the loss.32 Attempting to determine the
“efficient proximate cause” of a loss in insurance disputes is misguided because
most losses have many causes and it is a legal fiction to suggest that only one
peril caused a loss.33 Consequently, applying tort causation concepts to insur-
ance disputes not only increases the costs of litigation by encouraging debates
regarding “the” cause of the loss, but also leads to unpredictable and inconsis-
tent results.
Applying the interpretation proposed in this Article should provide more
certainty and predictability in the outcome of insurance disputes than malleable
tort tests such as the “efficient proximate cause” or “separate and intervening
cause” tests, which invite debate and litigation. Thus, under this proposed
approach, litigation costs should be largely eliminated in many insurance
claims involving the ensuing loss clause because many claims should never
result in litigation where the outcome of such litigation is predictable. Further,
disputes that nonetheless end up in court should be capable of being resolved
by a summary judgment motion rather than by a jury at trial because the parties
should not need to debate which “cause” of the loss was “dominant” or came
first or whether a “separate and intervening” covered peril occurred after an
excluded peril. Consequently, trial judges should be able to decide such cases
simply by applying the policy language to the undisputed facts of the case.
This Article discusses the ensuing loss clause and how the clause should
be interpreted and applied in five parts. Part I discusses the relevant policy
28 See discussion infra Part III.
29 See discussion infra Part III.B.
30 See discussion infra Part III.A.
31 See discussion infra Parts IV.A–B.
32 See discussion infra Parts IV.A–B.
33 See discussion infra Parts IV.A–B.
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language and the various iterations of the ensuing loss clause. Part II addresses
the principles of insurance policy interpretation relevant to analyzing and
applying the ensuing loss clause. Part III discusses the different approaches
courts have taken in interpreting and applying the clause, including certain
courts’ attempts to incorporate tort causation principles into the clause. Part IV
discusses the problems and inefficiencies associated with the existing
approaches to interpreting and applying the clause, and Part V presents the
author’s thoughts regarding how the clause should be interpreted and applied.
The Article concludes that when the rules of policy interpretation are applied to
the ensuing loss clause, and the strengths and weaknesses of the various
approaches to interpreting and applying the clause are considered, a loss should
be covered even if an excluded peril played a role in causing the loss so long as
the loss is caused at least in part by a covered peril.
I. THE RELEVANT POLICY LANGUAGE
A. The Insuring Agreement
“All risk” property and homeowners policies typically contain broad
insuring language that is the same as or similar to the following: “This policy
insures against all risks of direct physical loss or damage to property
insured . . . except as excluded.”34
B. The Ensuing Loss Clause
Under “all risk” property policies, the ensuing loss clause is commonly
worded as follows: “This policy does not insure loss or damage caused directly
or indirectly by any Peril excluded. . . . [such as the Perils of] faulty workman-
ship or faulty materials, unless loss or damage from an insured Peril ensues and
then only for such ensuing loss or damage.”35 As previously noted, the ensuing
loss clause often follows an anti-concurrent causation exclusion and the terms
“ensues,” “ensuing loss,” and “peril” are not defined in such policies.
An ensuing loss clause in a homeowners policy often is worded as fol-
lows: “We insure for all risks of physical loss to the property described in
Coverage A except for loss caused by . . . deterioration, . . . latent defect, . . .
[or] wet or dry rot . . . . Any ensuing loss from [an excluded cause listed above
that is] not excluded is covered.”36 Again, “ensuing loss” is not defined in the
policy.
II. PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE POLICY INTERPRETATION RELEVANT TO THE
APPLICATION OF THE ENSUING LOSS CLAUSE
When courts are asked to interpret and apply policy language such as the
ensuing loss clause, three well-established rules of policy interpretation are par-
34 See, e.g., Blaine Constr. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1999)
(emphasis omitted). See also cases cited infra notes 56, 80, and 103.
35 Blaine Constr. Corp., 171 F.3d at 346; see also cases cited infra notes 56, 80, 103.
36 Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1336 (Ariz. 1985) (emphasis
omitted). See also Blaine Constr. Corp., 171 F.3d at 346; cases cited infra notes 56, 80, 103.
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ticularly relevant to the analysis: (1) contra proferentem, (2) the “reasonable
expectations” doctrine, and (3) construction of the policy as a whole.
A. The Doctrine of Contra Proferentem
It is hornbook insurance law that because insurers are the drafters of pol-
icy language, such as the ensuing loss clause,37 the doctrine of contra profer-
entem applies, which means any ambiguities in the policy language should be
construed against the insurers and in favor of coverage.38 The test under many
states’ laws for determining whether policy language is ambiguous is whether
the provisions at issue are reasonably or fairly susceptible to different interpre-
tations or meanings.39 If the policyholder and insurer both offer reasonable
37 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
38 See 13 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 16, § 7401; 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra
note 16, § 22:14; 4 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE §§ 16.04, 16.06
(2009); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 5.1 (1994); 1-2
BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE GUIDE § 2.02[1] (Matthew Bender & Co. ed.,
2012) [hereinafter BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW GUIDE]; 1 BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R.
NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 1.03[b][1] (15th ed. Supp.
2011); David B. Goodwin, Disputing Insurance Coverage Disputes, 43 STAN. L. REV. 779,
795 (1991) (reviewing BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSUR-
ANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES (3d ed. 1990)). See also Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971) (“Any ambiguity or uncertainty in an insurance policy is to
be resolved against the insurer.”); Phillips Home Builders, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700
A.2d 127, 129 (Del. 1997) (“If there is an ambiguity, however, the contract language is
‘construed most strongly against the insurance company that drafted it.’ ”); Crawford v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 783 P.2d 900, 904 (Kan. 1989) (“Since an insurer prepares its own
contracts, it has a duty to make the meaning clear, and if it fails to do so, the insurer, and not
the insured, must suffer.”); RPM Pizza, Inc. v. Auto. Cas. Ins. Co., 601 So. 2d 1366, 1369
(La. 1992) (“[A]ny ambiguity must be construed against the insurance company and in favor
of the reasonable construction that affords coverage.”); Am. Bumper and Mfg. Co. v. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co., 550 N.W.2d 475, 480 (Mich. 1996) (“[I]n construing insurance contracts,
any ambiguities are strictly construed against the insurer to maximize coverage.”); Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Flanagin, 210 A.2d 221, 226 (N.J. 1965) (“If the controlling language will sup-
port two meanings, one favorable to the insurer, and the other favorable to the insured, the
interpretation sustaining coverage must be applied.”); Gomolka v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,
436 N.E.2d 1347, 1348–49 (Ohio 1982) (“Policies of insurance, which are in language
selected by the insurer and which are reasonably open to different interpretations, will be
construed most favorably for the insured.”).
39 See 13 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 16, § 7403 (insurer has burden of establish-
ing that insurer’s interpretation is the only fair interpretation of contract); 4 LONG, supra
note 38, § 16.06, at 16–35. See also Shepard v. CalFarm Life Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 428,
432–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (“A policy provision is ambiguous when it is capable of two or
more constructions, both of which are reasonable” and the burden of proving one reasonable
construction falls to the insurer) (internal quotation marks omitted); Phillips Home Builders,
Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 700 A.2d 127, 130 (Del. 1997) (“ ‘Convoluted or confusing terms
are the problem of the insurer . . . not the insured.’ ”) (quoting Pa. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146, 1149–50 (Del. 1997)); High Country Assocs. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 648
A.2d 474, 476 (N.H. 1994) (“If the language of the policy reasonably may be interpreted
more than one way and one interpretation favors coverage, an ambiguity exists in the policy
that will be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.”); Salem Grp. v. Oliver,
607 A.2d 138, 139 (N.J. 1992) (“When a policy fairly supports an interpretation favorable to
both the insured and the insurer, the policy should be interpreted in favor of the insured.”);
Harris, Jolliff & Michel, Inc. v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 255 N.E.2d 302, 306–07 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1970) (where insurer and insured each presented reasonable interpretations of exclu-
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interpretations of the policy language, then the policy language is ambiguous
and should be construed in favor of coverage.40 Where the controversy
involves a phrase that the insurers have failed to define and has generated many
lawsuits with varying results, common sense dictates that the policy language
must be ambiguous.41
Further, because the exclusions that contain the ensuing loss clause
purport to limit coverage that otherwise is provided, the exclusionary
language should be narrowly construed and not interpreted and applied in
such a way as to swallow the basic coverages provided under a policy.42
sion, exclusion is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of the insured); Bartlett v.
Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 593 A.2d 45, 47–48 (R.I. 1991) (noting ambiguity if clause has more
than one reasonable meaning); Bonner v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 841 S.W.2d 504, 506
(Tex. App. 1992) (“The court must adopt the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by
the insured as long as [the] construction is not unreasonable, even if the construction urged
by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties’
intent.”).
40 See sources cited supra note 39 and accompanying text.
41 See New Castle Cnty. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 744, 756 (3d Cir. 2001)
(finding ambiguity where the contested phrase was not defined and had been interpreted
differently by various courts); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Investors Diversified Ltd., 407 So.
2d 314, 316 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“The insurance company contends that the language
is not ambiguous, but we cannot agree and offer as proof of that pudding the fact that the
Supreme Court of California and the Fifth Circuit in New Orleans have arrived at opposite
conclusions from a study of essentially the same language.”); Crawford v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 783 P.2d 900, 908 (Kan. 1989) (“[R]eported cases are in conflict, the trial judge and the
Court of Appeals reached different conclusions and the justices of this court [disa-
gree] . . . . Under such circumstances, the clause is, by definition, ambiguous and must be
interpreted in favor of the insured.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
311 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958) (“Since we assume that all courts adopt a reasonable
construction, the conflict is of itself indicative that the word as so used is susceptible of at
least two reasonable interpretations, one of which extends the coverage to the situation at
hand.”); George H. Olmsted & Co. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 161 N.E. 276, 276 (Ohio 1928)
(“Where the language of a clause used in an insurance contract is such that courts of numer-
ous jurisdictions have found it necessary to construe it and in such construction have arrived
at conflicting conclusions as to the correct meaning, intent and effect thereof, the question
whether such clause is ambiguous ceases to be an open one.”) (quoting the Syllabus by the
Court); Cohen v. Erie Indem. Co., 432 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981) (“The mere fact
that [courts differ on the construction of the provision] itself creates the inescapable conclu-
sion that the provision in issue is susceptible to more than one interpretation.”). See also 4
LONG, supra note 38, § 16.06, at 16-32–16-33; BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW GUIDE, supra
note 38, § 2.02[1](2); STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 5.8; Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Divi-
sion of Opinion Among Judges on Same Court or Among Other Courts or Jurisdictions
Considering Same Question, as Evidence that Particular Clause of Insurance Policy is
Ambiguous, 4 A.L.R.4th 1253 § 5 (1981).
42 See Tews Funeral Home, Inc. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 832 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir. 1987)
(policy excluding acts explicitly covered in prior section of policy construed against insurer);
Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 390 (D. Del. 2002) (ambiguities
construed against insurer in order to reduce the insurer’s incentive to draft policy language
where certain provisions purport to give coverage while other clauses take that very cover-
age away); Titan Indem. Co. v. Newton, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1348 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (find-
ing coverage even though “[t]he limitations of [the] policy completely swallow up the
insuring provisions”); Bailer v. Erie Ins. Exch., 687 A.2d 1375, 1380 (Md. 1997) (“If the
exclusion totally swallows the insuring provision,” then such provisions create the greatest
form of ambiguity, and the insurer is obliged to provide coverage.).
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Further, the insurer has the burden of proving the exclusions are applic-
able.43
So how does contra proferentem apply in the context of interpreting and
applying the ensuing loss clause? As is discussed above and below in Part IV,
an ambiguous insurance policy provision is one that has more than one reasona-
ble meaning.44 The ensuing loss clause is ambiguous in large part because its
key term, “ensuing loss,” is undefined and the courts have struggled to even
determine what the test should be to ascertain whether a loss ensues from a
covered peril.45 Consequently, the ambiguities should be construed against
insurers in such cases.46
B. The “Reasonable Expectations” Doctrine
Another staple of insurance policy interpretation law is that a policy
should be interpreted to fulfill the “reasonable expectations” of the policy-
holder.47 A seminal article regarding the “reasonable expectations” doctrine
was written more than forty years ago by then-Professor Robert Keeton.48 After
43 See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Minn. 1995) (insurer has
burden “to prove the applicability of the exclusion as an affirmative defense”); Cont’l Ins.
Co. v. Louis Marx & Co., 415 N.E.2d 315, 317 (Ohio 1980) (insurer has burden of proving
defense based upon exclusion); Brown v. Snohomish Cnty. Physicians Corp., 845 P.2d 334,
340 (Wash. 1993) (once insured has made a “prima facie case that there is coverage,” the
burden shifts to the insurer to prove an exclusionary provision applies). See also 13
APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 16, § 12275; 17A COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note
16, § 254:12.
44 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
45 See infra Parts III–IV.
46 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.
47 See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 38, at 42–53 (identifying courts in forty states,
Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia that have expressed support for, or applied a form
of, the reasonable expectations doctrine); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE
LAW 633–35 (student ed. 1988); 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 16, § 22.11; LONG,
supra note 38, § 16.07, at 16–39; BUSINESS INSURANCE LAW GUIDE, supra note 38,
§ 2.02[1]; STEMPEL, supra note 38, § 11.1, at 312. See also AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court,
799 P.2d 1253, 1264 (Cal. 1990) (finding ambiguous coverage clauses of insurance policies
are to be interpreted broadly to protect the objectively reasonable expectations of the
insured); Roland v. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 462 S.E.2d 623, 625 (Ga. 1995) (“A
contract of insurance should be strictly construed against the insurer and read in favor of
coverage in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”); Corgatelli v.
Global Life & Accident Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 737, 740–41 (Idaho 1975) (applying reasonable
expectations doctrine to exclusion notwithstanding conclusion that the provision was unam-
biguous); A.B.C. Builders, Inc. v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 661 A.2d 1187, 1190 (N.H. 1995)
(“[T]he policy language must be so clear as to create no ambiguity which might affect the
insured’s reasonable expectations.”); Fed. Ins. Co. v. Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 824
P.2d 302, 308 (N.M. 1992) (giving effect to policyholder’s reasonable expectations in con-
struing policy language); Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 671–73
(N.D. 1977) (finding the doctrine of reasonable expectations properly invoked to discern
intentions of parties and impose liability on insurer); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. McMahon &
Sons, Inc., 356 S.E.2d 488, 495–96 (W. Va. 1987) (applying reasonable expectations doc-
trine to construe the policy in a manner that “a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the
insured would expect the language to mean,” even though painstaking examination “of the
policy provisions would have negated those expectations.”).
48 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 961, 967 (1970).
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he became a judge, he summarized the doctrine in his treatise as follows: “In
general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of applicants, insureds,
and intended beneficiaries regarding the coverage afforded by insurance con-
tracts even though a careful examination of the policy provisions indicates that
such expectations are contrary to the expressed intention of the insurer.”49 As
another law professor more recently stated, “In other words, even when the
policy language unambiguously precludes coverage, under certain circum-
stances, courts will hold that coverage exists.”50
Stated slightly differently, policyholders should receive the coverage they
reasonably expect even if the insurer can point to some policy language that
supports the insurer’s position that the claim at issue should not be covered.51
Thus, for example, a policyholder who buys an “all risk” homeowners policy to
protect his home from damage caused by storms should be covered for rain
damage because he reasonably expected that coverage.
So what does this mean in the context of the ensuing loss clause? As is
discussed below in Part IV, because the clause is, at best, ambiguous, one
arguably does not even need to apply the reasonable expectations doctrine. The
49 KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 47, at 633. For commentary regarding the reasonable
expectations doctrine, see Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial
Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1395 (2007) (criticizing
the reasonable expectations doctrine and arguing that the case law endorsing the doctrine is
“confused and inconsistent”); Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21, 35–41 (1998) (discussing the doctrine as
conceptualized by Keeton); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations
in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 825–26 (1990) (providing a
historical account of the doctrine and asserting that the doctrine is principled and can be
applied within justifiable guidelines); William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seek-
ing a Principled Application, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 267, 287–96 (1986) (formulating standards
for applying the doctrine); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18
CONN. L. REV. 323, 392 (1986) (arguing for refinements to the doctrine in response to the
fading appeal that the doctrine holds for courts and commentators and contending that courts
should “discard their unfortunate tendency to speak the platitudes of reasonable expectations
without undertaking a careful and systematic analysis”); Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made
Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67
VA. L. REV. 1151, 1151–52 (1981). While there is relatively broad acceptance of the doc-
trine, judicial interpretation and application of the doctrine is variable. See Peter Nash
Swisher, A Realistic Consensus Approach to the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 35 TORT & INS. L.J. 729, 731–32 (2000) (exploring judicial responses and
proposing a middle ground approach); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue
Restriction of the Reasonable Expectations Approach and the Misleading Mythology of Judi-
cial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181, 191–92 (1998) (describing judicial approaches and noting
both liberal and narrow approaches among the numerous states that have adopted the
doctrine).
50 Francis J. Mootz III, Insurance Coverage of Employment Discrimination Claims, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 22 (1997).
51 The reasonable expectations doctrine is rooted in the fact that insurance policies generally
are contracts of adhesion drafted by insurers and offered to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis. See Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 1394, 1401–02. See also Keeton, supra note 48, at
967; Friedrick Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629–30 (1943); Susan M. Popik & Carol D. Quackenbos, Reasona-
ble Expectations After Thirty Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 425, 433 (1998);
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1225 (1983).
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ambiguities in the clause should be construed in favor of the policyholder.
Nonetheless, even if the clause were viewed as unambiguous, a policyholder
who buys an “all risk” policy reasonably expects to receive coverage for cov-
ered losses that may be caused, in part, by excluded perils so long as the loss is
caused by, or ensues, at least in part, from a covered peril. In other words, in
the leaking roof example discussed in the Introduction, courts should not permit
insurers to agree in the insuring agreement portion of the policy to cover “all
risks” including rain damage, but then, when a claim is presented, deny cover-
age based upon the argument that, although rainwater damaged the home, an
excluded peril—faulty workmanship in the form of faulty roof installation—
allowed the rainwater to enter the house. Such a denial renders the coverage
provided to the homeowner under the policy illusory, which is impermissible.52
C. Construction of the Policy as a Whole
The third policy interpretation principle applicable to the ensuing loss
clause provides that, if possible, the policy should be interpreted in a way that
reconciles its various provisions and attempts to give effect to all of them.53 In
essence, this principle means that courts should give effect to all of the policies’
provisions if possible, and, do so in a way that is consistent with the general
purpose of the policy as a whole.54 In the context of the ensuing loss clause,
this means that the exclusionary language contained in the anti-concurrent cau-
sation exclusion should not be read in isolation in determining whether a claim
is covered. To the contrary, courts should first look to the insuring language in
the policy as well as the exclusionary language and its ensuing loss clause to
52 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. See also Bowersox Truck Sales & Serv., Inc.
v. Harco Nat’l Ins. Co., 209 F.3d 273, 277–78 (3rd Cir. 2000) (rejecting insurer’s interpreta-
tion of policy’s two-year limitation period where interpretation would have rendered cover-
age illusory); Harris v. Gulf Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1226 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting
insurer’s interpretation of exclusion in policy because “it would render the coverage pro-
vided by the policy illusory”); Alstrin v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 179 F. Supp. 2d 376, 398
(D. Del. 2002) (rejecting insurer’s interpretation of the policy’s deliberate fraud exclusion
where, if applied, “there would be little or nothing left to that coverage” because “[n]o
insured would expect such limited coverage from a policy that purports to cover all types of
securities fraud claims”); Atofina Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 185 S.W.3d 440,
444–45 (Tex. 2005) (rejecting insurer’s interpretation of additional insured endorsement
because it “would render coverage under the endorsement largely illusory”).
53 See GA. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2(4) (2012) (stating contracts should be interpreted as a
whole); Rothenberg v. Lincoln Farm Camp, Inc., 755 F.2d 1017, 1019 (2d Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing New York Law, finding “an interpretation that gives a reasonable and effective meaning
to all the terms of a contract is generally preferred to one that leaves a part unreasonable or
of no effect”); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 234 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1169
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“ ‘In short, an insurance contract is to be construed in a manner which
gives meaning to all its provisions in a natural, reasonable, and practical manner, having
reference to the risk and subject matter and to the purposes of the entire contract.’ ”) (quot-
ing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Crane, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1127, 1132 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990)); Weiss v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 319 N.E.2d 491, 495 (Ill. 1974) (provisions in an
insurance policy should be interpreted in context of entire policy); Welborn v. Ill. Nat’l Cas.
Co., 106 N.E.2d 142, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1952) (explaining that “the court should determine
the intention [of the parties] from the whole agreement, and endeavor to give a meaning to
all provisions, so far as possible, which will render them consistent and operative.”).
54 See sources cited supra note 53.
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determine whether the policy covers the claim at issue. Thus, when analyzing
whether coverage exists for a claim, the exclusionary language, ensuing loss
clause, and insuring agreement language should be read as a whole—keeping
in mind that the basic purpose of insurance is to protect the policyholder from
losses in exchange for the payment of a premium. To do otherwise could allow
the insurance coverage purchased to become illusory.55
III. COURT INTERPRETATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE
ENSUING LOSS CLAUSE
A. Some Courts Have Interpreted the Clause to Require that a Covered
Peril Be the “Efficient Proximate Cause” of the Loss in Order for the
Loss To Be Covered
One school of thought regarding the interpretation and application of the
ensuing loss clause that has been endorsed by a handful of courts involves the
incorporation of the “efficient proximate cause” test into the clause.56 Under
this approach, the coverage determination turns, not upon an analysis of the
anti-concurrent causation language, but rather, upon an analysis of whether the
initial peril that started a causation chain of events that led to a loss was a
covered or an excluded peril.57 An example of a case in which a court
employed this test is the Supreme Court of Washington’s decision in McDon-
ald v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.58
In McDonald, a house was built on a hill,59 and after heavy rains, the
ground on the lower side of the house slid away and the foundation of the
house cracked.60 The policy at issue provided that the insurer would cover
losses due to “accidental direct physical loss” subject to a number of listed
exclusions.61 One of the listed exclusions was for “foundation cracking.”62
55 See supra notes 42, 51–52; see also discussion infra Part IV.
56 See Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Evansville Vanderburgh, Pub. Library, 860 N.E.2d 636,
639, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding faulty workmanship, which the policy excluded, the
efficient proximate cause of loss); Alwart v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 508 S.E.2d 531,
533–34 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (implicitly using an “efficient proximate cause” standard when
barring coverage for all losses ensuing from faulty workmanship); McDonald v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 837 P.2d 1000, 1006 (Wash. 1992) (en banc) (discussing the “efficient
proximate cause” rule and holding the ensuing loss clause did not reinstate coverage for a
loss caused by faulty workmanship); Bedford, LLC v. Safeco Ins. Co., 140 Wash. App.
1033, No. 55341-1-I, 2007 WL 2757271, at *2–3 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2007) (ensuing
loss clause was inapplicable because the last event in chain of causation was an excluded
peril); Wright v. Safeco Ins. Co., 109 P.3d 1, 8 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (applying efficient
proximate cause test and concluding mold contamination was caused by excluded peril).
57 See cases cited supra note 56. Notably, in other contexts in which courts have applied the
“efficient proximate cause” test, the analysis turns on what the “dominant” cause of the loss
was. See W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Univ. of N.D., 643 N.W.2d 4, 10–12, 14 (N.D. 2002);
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 18, § 7.02; Joseph Lavitt, The Doctrine of
Efficient Proximate Cause, the Katrina Disaster, Prosser’s Folly, and the Third Restatement
of Torts: Cracking the Conundrum, 54 LOY. L. REV. 1, 15 (2008). Thus far, courts have not
attempted to apply this variation of the test to the ensuing loss clause.
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Another exclusion provided: “We do not insure under any coverage for loss
consisting of one or more of the items below: . . . inadequacy, fault or unsound-
ness in . . . design, specifications, workmanship, construction, grading, compac-
tion . . . of any property . . . .” The exclusion did, however, “insure for any
ensuing loss from [the above] items . . . unless the ensuing loss is itself a Loss
Not Insured by this Section.”63
The insurer, citing engineers’ conclusions that the damage was caused by
the “faulty design and construction of the filled area near the foundation with
unsuitable fill materials,” denied coverage for the claim.64 The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer based upon the above exclu-
sions in the policy.65 The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling
based upon the ensuing loss clause.66 The Supreme Court of Washington
reversed the Court of Appeals’ ruling and reinstated the trial court’s ruling.67
In explaining its holding, the Supreme Court of Washington described the
“efficient proximate cause” rule under Washington law as follows:
[T]he efficient proximate cause rule operates when an “insured risk” or covered peril
sets into motion a chain of causation which leads to an uncovered loss. If the efficient
proximate cause of the final loss is a covered peril, then the loss is covered under the
policy. In chain of causation cases, the efficient proximate cause rule is properly
applied after (1) a determination of which single act or event is the efficient proxi-
mate cause of the loss and (2) a determination that the efficient proximate cause of
the loss is a covered peril.68
The court then rejected the argument that the ensuing loss clause was
either ambiguous or reinstated coverage for the otherwise excluded loss at
issue: “The ensuing loss clause may be confusing, but it is not ambiguous.
Reasonably interpreted, the ensuing loss clause says that if one of the specified
uncovered events takes place, any ensuing loss which is otherwise covered by
the policy will remain covered.”69 The court then concluded, “[i]nasmuch as no
reasonable reading of the policy indicates that the efficient proximate cause of
the property losses was a covered peril [in this case, there is no coverage].”70
Notably, in reaching its decision, the court looked only at the “initial”
event that set in motion the causal chain of events that led to the loss in deter-
mining what the efficient proximate cause was, which the policyholder con-
ceded was faulty construction, an excluded peril.71
62 Id. n.1 (quoting a State Farm Homeowners Insurance Policy § 1—Losses Not Insured).
63 Id. at 1002 n.3 (emphasis added) (quoting a State Farm Homeowners Insurance Policy
§ 1–Losses Not Insured).
64 Id. at 1002–03.
65 Id. at 1003.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 1002.
68 Id. at 1004 (internal citation omitted).
69 Id. at 1005.
70 Id. at 1006.
71 Id. In Vision One, LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of
Washington clarified that the application of the efficient proximate cause test under Wash-
ington law in ensuing loss cases is intended to benefit policyholders. Specifically, the court
stated “[t]he efficient proximate cause rule operates as an interpretive tool to establish cover-
age when a covered peril ‘sets other causes into motion which, in an unbroken sequence,
230 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:215
The Hartford Casualty Insurance Company v. Evansville Vanderburgh,
Public Library case is another example of a court using the “efficient proxi-
mate cause” test when interpreting and applying an ensuing loss clause.72 In
Evansville Vanderburgh, a historic library was damaged during the excavation
of a nearby property.73 The library had an “all risk” property policy that con-
tained an anti-concurrent causation exclusion for certain perils and contained
this ensuing loss clause:
We will not pay for loss or damage caused by, resulting from, or arising out of
any acts, errors, or omissions by you or others in any of the following activities,
regardless of any other cause or event that contributes concurrently, or in any
sequence to the loss or damage:
. . . .
Design, specifications, workmanship, repair, construction, renovation, remodel-
ing, grading, compaction . . . . [However,] [i]f physical loss or damage by a Covered
Cause of Loss ensues, we will pay only for such ensuing loss or damage.74
The insurer denied coverage for the claim on the basis that the loss alleg-
edly was caused by the nearby excavation work which fell within the excluded
perils of “design, specification, workmanship, construction, and renova-
tion . . . .”75 The insurer also contended the ensuing loss clause did not reinstate
coverage for the claim because the clause “does not expand coverage.”76
The Indiana Court of Appeals rejected the library’s argument that the
ensuing loss clause reinstated coverage for the loss.77 In doing so, the court did
not analyze the anti-concurrent causation exclusionary language, but rather,
applied the “efficient proximate cause” test to determine whether the initial
event that started the causal chain of events that led to the loss was a covered or
an excluded peril:
In this analysis, the concept of insurance law called the efficient proximate
cause of loss rule is helpful. . . . “The efficient proximate cause rule states that where
a peril specifically insured against sets other causes into motion which, in an unbro-
ken sequence, produce the result for which recovery is sought, the loss is covered,
even though other events within the chain of causation are excluded from coverage.
‘Stated in another fashion, where an insured risk itself sets into operation a chain of
produce the result for which recovery is sought.’ ” 276 P.3d 300, 309 (Wash. 2012) (en
banc) (quoting McDonald, 837 P.2d at 1004).
The opposite proposition, however, is not a rule of law. When an excluded peril sets in
motion a causal chain that includes covered perils, the efficient proximate cause rule does not
mandate exclusion of the loss. . . . “the efficient proximate cause rule operates in favor of cover-
age. A converse rule would, of course, operate in favor of no coverage. . . . Because policies
should normally be construed in favor of coverage, because there is no settled law favoring this
argument, contrary to the insurer’s claim, and because the insurer does not offer any further
justification or authority supporting such a rule, we decline to adopt the rule urged by the
insurer.”
Id. (quoting Key Tronic Corp. v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 881 P.2d 201, 206
(Wash. 1994)).
72 Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Evansville Vanderburgh, Pub. Library, 860 N.E.2d 636, 647
(Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
73 Id. at 638–39.
74 Id. at 641 (emphasis omitted).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 646.
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causation in which the last step may have been an excepted risk, the excepted risk
will not defeat recovery.’ ”78
The court then denied coverage, finding it undisputed that the loss was caused
by an excluded peril.79
In sum, courts that have incorporated the “efficient proximate cause” test
into the ensuing loss clause seek to determine whether the initial event in a
causation chain of events that results in a loss is a covered or an excluded peril
regardless of the presence or absence of an anti-concurrent causation exclusion.
If the initial event is a covered peril, then the loss is covered. But if the initial
event is an excluded peril, then the policyholder will need to show that another
covered peril subsequently occurred prior to the loss in order to have an oppor-
tunity to recover.
B. Some Courts Have Interpreted the Clause to Require that a “Separate
and Intervening” Covered Peril Be the Cause of the Loss in Order for
the Loss To Be Covered
The second school of thought, which has been adopted by several courts,
is that insurance coverage for an otherwise excluded loss will be reinstated
under the ensuing loss clause only if the damage at issue was caused by a
“separate and intervening” peril that is covered even if the policy contains an
anti-concurrent causation exclusion.80 An example of such a decision is Bill O.
78 Id. (quoting McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 837 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Wash.
1992)).
79 Id. at 647.
80 See, e.g., In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 223 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding
damage caused by Hurricane Katrina was due to flooding, an excluded cause of loss not
ensuing from the negligent construction of levees); GTE Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co.,
372 F.3d 598, 618 (3rd Cir. 2004) (holding Y2K losses were not covered because they did
not ensue from a covered peril); Merz v. Markel Ins. Co., No. G032263, 2004 WL 392890,
at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (finding the collapse of a retaining wall caused by a faulty grading
of a slope was not covered because no separate and independent cause of the damages
occurred); Swire Pac. Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 845 So. 2d 161, 167–68 (Fla. 2003)
(finding repair of structural deficiencies flowing from design defects was not an ensuing loss
because there was no damage separate from the defects themselves); Bd. of Educ. v. Int’l
Ins. Co., 684 N.E.2d 978, 980 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (holding costs to repair asbestos-related
property damage excluded by asbestos exclusion because the loss did not ensue from a sepa-
rate covered peril); Weeks v. Coop. Ins. Cos., 817 A.2d 292, 296 (N.H. 2003) (explaining
damage due to negligent construction was not covered under ensuing loss clause because
there was not a separate and intervening covered cause of the loss); Narob Dev. Corp. v. Ins.
Co. of N. Am., 631 N.Y.S.2d 155, 155 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding a faulty workman-
ship exclusion barred coverage for collapse of retaining wall because there was no damage
other than collapsed retaining wall); Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 751 (Tex.
2006) (holding mold contamination caused by routine drips and leaks was excluded under
mold exclusion because the contamination did not ensue from a covered water damage
event); Vision One, L.L.C. v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 276 P.3d 300, 302–03, 311
(Wash. 2012) (allowing insurance recovery under an ensuing loss clause for damage caused
by the collapse of a floor, a non-excluded peril in an all-risk policy, but not for the faulty
workmanship, an excluded peril, that led to the collapse); Sprague v. Safeco Ins. Co., 276
P.3d 1270, 1273 (Wash. 2012) (barring insurance recovery for a deck that was about to
collapse due to rotting caused by faulty workmanship, an excluded peril, where no separate
loss ensued from a covered peril).
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Weeks v. Co-Operative Insurance Companies.81 In Weeks, a brick veneer wall
was built over an existing asphalt shingle wall.82 More than four decades later,
the brick veneer wall was damaged when it separated from the asphalt shingle
wall.83 When the policyholder presented a claim for the damage, the insurer
denied coverage on the basis that the damage was caused by faulty
workmanship.84
The insuring agreement in the policy at issue stated that the insurer agreed
to cover “ ‘direct physical loss of or damage to Covered Property at the prem-
ises described in the Declarations caused by or resulting from any Covered
Cause of Loss’ . . . ‘unless the loss is . . . [e]xcluded.’ ”85 The exclusions
section of the policy provided: “We will not pay for loss or damage caused by
or resulting from any of the following. . . . Faulty, inadequate or defective . . .
[d]esign, . . . workmanship, . . . [or] construction . . . of part or all of any
property on or off the described premises.”86 However, the section went on to
state: “[I]f an excluded cause of loss that is listed above results in a ‘specified
cause of loss’ . . . we will pay for the loss or damage caused by that ‘specified
cause of loss.’ ”87
The trial court found the policy language ambiguous and held the repair of
the faulty workmanship itself was not covered but the damage that ensued from
the faulty workmanship was covered.88 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
reversed and entered judgment in favor of the insurer.89
In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire explained
its understanding of the purpose of the ensuing loss clause as follows:
“[C]overage will be reinstated under the exception to the exclusion when an
excluded risk sets into motion a chain of causation which leads to a covered
cause of loss. In that case, the policy insures against damage directly caused by
the ensuing covered cause of loss.”90
The court then, however, without actual reference to the policy language
at issue or the rules of policy interpretation, applied a “separate and indepen-
dent” cause or damage test to the facts of the case and held the loss was not
covered:
Here, there was no subsequent ensuing cause of loss separate and independent
from the initial excluded cause of loss, i.e., the faulty workmanship. Therefore, we
conclude that the exception to the exclusion for faulty workmanship does not
apply.91
Acme Galvanizing Company, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company
is another example of a court applying a “separate and intervening cause” test
to determine whether coverage for a loss was reinstated under an ensuing loss
81 Weeks, 817 A.2d 292.





87 Id. at 295.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 297.
90 Id. at 296.
91 Id.
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clause.92 In Acme, a manufacturing company that used molten zinc in its opera-
tions had purchased an “all risk” property policy.93 The policy also contained
the following anti-concurrent causation exclusion and ensuing loss clause:
The Property Coverage does not insure against loss caused by, resulting from, con-
tributed to or aggravated by . . . [i]nherent vice, latent defect, wear and tear, marring
and scratching, gradual deterioration, moths, termites or other insects or vermin,
unless loss by a peril not otherwise excluded ensues and then the Company shall be
liable only for such ensuing loss . . . .94
During the policyholder’s operations, an 84-ton capacity kettle that con-
tained molten zinc ruptured and several tons of the hot, liquid metal escaped.95
The free flow of molten zinc damaged or destroyed equipment including fur-
nace burners and floorboards in the area of the release.96
The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the kettle failed due to “poor
welding techniques.”97 The insurer deemed the poor welding an “inherent vice
and latent defect,” and therefore an excluded peril.98 The parties hired experts
to opine on the cause of the kettle failure.99 At trial, rather than let the jury
decide the case, the judge entered a judgment of non-suit against the policy-
holder based on the exclusions quoted above.100
On appeal, the policyholder argued that even if the kettle failure was
caused by an excluded peril, the ensuing loss clause reinstated coverage for the
damage in the area near the kettle that subsequently occurred after the kettle
failure when the molten metal escaped.101 The appellate court disagreed,
stating:
We interpret the ensuing loss provision to apply to the situation where there is a
“peril,” i.e., a hazard or occurrence which causes a loss or injury, separate and inde-
pendent but resulting from the original excluded peril, and this new peril is not an
excluded one, from which loss ensues. . . .
Here, there was no peril separate from and in addition to the initial excluded
peril of the welding failure and kettle rupture.102
Again, the anti-concurrent causation language was not part of the court’s
analysis.
In short, under the interpretation of the ensuing loss clause adopted by the
Weeks and Acme courts, in order for a loss caused at least in part by an
excluded peril to be covered under an ensuing loss clause, a court or jury must
determine that the causation chain of events and related damage can be segre-
gated by separate, independent perils and that portions of the damage can be
92 Acme Galvanizing Co., Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 270 Cal. Rptr. 405, 411 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990).
93 Id. at 407.
94 Id. (emphasis added).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 408.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at 409.
101 Id. at 410.
102 Id. at 411.
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attributed to each such peril even if the policy contains an anti-concurrent cau-
sation exclusion.
C. Some Courts Have Interpreted the Clause to Reinstate Coverage for an
Otherwise Excluded Loss Where the Loss Is Caused in Part by a Non-
Excluded Peril
Several courts have adopted a third approach to analyzing the issue,
wherein the focus is on whether the loss at issue was caused at least in part by a
covered peril even if the policy has anti-concurrent causation exclusionary lan-
guage. If the loss was caused at least in part by a covered peril, then coverage
for the loss is preserved by the ensuing loss clause regardless of whether an
excluded peril also played a role in causing the loss.103 The Supreme Court of
Arizona’s decision in Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company,104 is
an example of such a case.
In Roberts, honeybees were constructing a hive in the attic of a home.105
The homeowners contacted an exterminator to remove the bees.106 A few days
after the bees were eliminated, honey began dripping into the dining room.107
The homeowners presented their insurer with a claim for the damage to the
dining room, and the insurer denied coverage on the basis that the policy
excluded coverage for damage caused by insects.108
103 See Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 45 F. App’x 646, 647 (9th Cir.
2002) (finding damage to foundation of building was covered notwithstanding faulty work-
manship exclusion because the loss ensued from earth movement, a covered peril); Blaine
Constr. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 349–50, 354 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining
under Tennessee law, despite faulty workmanship exclusion, coverage for loss caused by
faulty workmanship was reinstated under the ensuing loss exception because the exclusion
was ambiguous); Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 857
F.2d 286, 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining under Louisiana law, exclusion in all-risk
inland marine policy for mechanical breakdowns “unless an insured peril ensues” did not
exclude coverage for catastrophic damage to insured’s shiploader after worn out cable on
shiploader snapped because such damage was an ensuing loss); Jersey Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Heffron, 242 F.2d 136, 139 (4th Cir. 1957) (finding in favor of the policyholder, the court
stated, “it is immaterial where in the chain of causation the [covered peril] occurs”); Roberts
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) (finding damage
caused by insects covered through the “ensuing loss” provision because damage done after
bees were exterminated was a result of the leakage of honey from the bees’ hive); Rosenberg
v. First State Ins. Co., 280 Cal. Rptr. 388, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (excluding coverage in
all risk builder’s policy for faulty workmanship did not also exclude coverage for business
interruption losses that ensued from faulty workmanship); Husband v. Lafayette Ins. Co.,
635 So. 2d 309, 312 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (wear and tear exclusion was not applicable to
tenant’s damage to home because ensuing loss clause was ambiguous and “tenant abuse”
was not excluded); Goldner v. Otsego Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 336 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720–21 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1972) (finding water damage caused by an explosion was covered despite exclu-
sion for water damage because ensuing loss clause was ambiguous); Arnold v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 688 N.W.2d 708, 722 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (explaining loss caused by rain leaking
through damaged caulking covered under ensuing loss exception to faulty workmanship
exclusion).
104 Roberts, 705 P.2d 1335.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1336.
107 Id.
108 Id.
Fall 2012] THE “ENSUING LOSS” CLAUSE 235
The policy stated:
We insure for all risks of physical loss to the property . . . except for loss caused
by:
. . . .
6. wear and tear; . . . wet or dry rot; contamination; . . . settling, cracking,
shrinking, bulging, or expansion of . . . walls, floors, roofs or ceilings; birds, vermin,
rodents, insects or domestic animals. . . . Any ensuing loss from items 1 through 6 not
excluded is covered.109
Based upon this language, the insurer argued the loss—honey damage
caused by insects—was “clearly excluded from coverage by the terms of the
policy.”110 The trial court agreed with the insurer.111 The Arizona Court of
Appeals affirmed.112 The Supreme Court of Arizona, however, reversed.113
In reversing the lower courts’ rulings, the Supreme Court of Arizona first
considered whether the ensuing loss clause was ambiguous and concluded it
was not: “We note that the term ‘ensuing loss’ is nowhere defined in the pol-
icy. . . . [Nonetheless,] [w]e do not believe this language is ambiguous. It can-
not be construed in more than one sense.”114
The court then observed that the homeowners were not seeking coverage
for the damage in the attic caused by the bees before the bees were eliminated
and considered whether the damage at issue occurred before or after the bees
(i.e., the excluded peril) were gone, which the court considered dispositive of
the coverage issue.115 The court concluded that the damage at issue occurred
subsequent to the excluded peril because the bees were removed before the
honey appeared in the dining room: “[T]he word ‘ensuing’ means ‘to take place
afterward . . . to follow as a chance, likely, or necessary consequence:
RESULT . . . to follow in chronological succession.’ ”116 According to the
court, “[t]he plain import of this language is that the loss, due to honey seepage,
is an ensuing loss and is covered by the policy, unless one of the other various
exclusions applies.”117
In short, the honey damage in the dining room was covered under the
ensuing loss clause simply because it occurred after the bees had been elimi-
nated even though the honey damage unquestionably was caused by the bees,
an expressly excluded cause of loss. Stated differently, even though the initial
peril in the causation chain of events that caused the loss was an excluded peril,
because the damage occurred subsequent to the excluded peril and the policy
did not have a specific exclusion for the honey damage at issue, the ensuing
loss clause brought the loss back within coverage. Thus, in this instance the
ensuing loss clause resurrected coverage for losses that subsequently ensued
109 Id. (some emphasis added).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 1335.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1337.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1336–37.
116 Id. at 1337 (quoting Roberts v. State Farm, 705 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)
and citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 756 (1969)).
117 Id.
236 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:215
from an otherwise excluded peril (i.e., damage caused by insects) because the
ensuing damage was not expressly excluded.
Another example of a case in which a court held the ensuing loss clause
reinstated coverage for a loss that was caused in part by an excluded peril is
Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal District v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity
Company.118 In Lake Charles, a cable snapped on a ship loader at a harbor
terminal, which resulted in a heavy shuttle crashing into the interior of the
loader and causing extensive damage to the loader.119 The cable broke because
it was worn out.120
The policyholder had purchased a policy that covered “all risks of direct
physical loss or damage” unless otherwise excluded.121 The policy also con-
tained an exclusion for losses caused by mechanical breakdown but also
included the following ensuing loss clause: “This Policy DOES NOT INSURE
AGAINST loss caused by . . . [m]echanical or machinery breakdown; unless an
insured peril ensues, and then only for the actual loss or damage caused by such
ensuing peril.”122
Even though the loss arguably was caused by an excluded peril—mechan-
ical breakdown—the district court held that the policy covered the loss.123 The
Fifth Circuit affirmed, noting that it was “a judgment refusing to give effect to
an exclusion whose words, read literally, are meaningless.”124
In reaching its decision, the Fifth Circuit rejected the insurer’s argument
that the exclusionary language and ensuing loss clause were “plain and
unambiguous:”125
[T]he exclusion at issue here appears to be self-contradictory gibberish—it begins by
excluding mechanical breakdowns from coverage, yet concludes by allowing com-
pensation for all risks that ensue from such a breakdown. . . . Consequently, the
insurers’ initial argument that the exclusion is plain and unambiguous is unconvinc-
ing, and the exclusion must be interpreted according to the applicable state law rules
of construction.126
The Fifth Circuit then applied Louisiana law regarding the interpretation
of insurance policy language and construed the policy in favor of the
policyholder:
Under Louisiana law, an insurance policy is construed against the insur-
ers . . . . Doubts are resolved in favor of coverage. . . .
Whatever “ensuing peril” may mean, nothing in the policies indicates that cata-
strophic damage to a machine caused by its own mechanical breakdown cannot be
included within the term. Therefore, once doubts are resolved in [the policyholder’s]
118 Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 857 F.2d 286 (5th
Cir. 1988).




123 Id. at 287–88.
124 Id. at 287.
125 Id. at 288.
126 Id.
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favor, [the policyholder’s] assertion that the ship-loader accident was an insured
ensuing peril must be accepted.127
Finally, to support its decision, the Fifth Circuit also relied upon the rea-
sonable expectations of the policyholder:
[The policyholder’s] insurance policies covered all risks except those explicitly
excluded from coverage, and excluded coverage for mechanical breakdowns only
when no “insured peril ensue[d].” [The policyholder] might reasonably have assumed
that the catastrophic damage to its ship loader was an insured ensuing peril, and
absent a clear and intelligible exclusion in the policies, the insurers cannot take shel-
ter in ambiguities.128
In essence, the Fifth Circuit held in Lake Charles that even though the cause of
the loss itself (the cable breaking) was excluded, the loss that subsequently
resulted from the excluded peril was covered under the resurrecting powers of
the ensuing loss clause.
In addition to cases in which the courts have simply analyzed whether a
covered peril followed an excluded peril, such as the Lake Charles and Roberts
decisions, several courts have expressly considered and rejected the argument
that a “separate and intervening” covered peril must cause the loss in order for
coverage to be preserved by the ensuing loss clause.129 An example of such a
case is the Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ decision in Arnold v. Cincinnati Insur-
ance Company.130
In Arnold, various parts of a home were damaged by water, largely
because of damage to caulking around windows during cleaning and staining of
siding.131 The policy at issue provided coverage for “physical loss to prop-
erty.”132 The policy also contained an exclusion for losses caused by faulty
workmanship but had an exception to the exclusion for ensuing losses: “We do
not insure for loss to property . . . caused by [faulty workmanship]. However,
any ensuing loss to property . . . not excluded or excepted in this policy is
covered.”133
The insurer argued that in order for the ensuing loss clause to reinstate
coverage, a “separate and independent peril” must have caused the damage.134
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stating: “We conclude
there is no basis in the policy language for limiting the cause of an ensuing loss
to a ‘separate and independent peril.’ ”135 The court further stated, there must
be “a cause in addition to the excluded cause, but nothing in the policy lan-
guage defines the nature of that cause as [the insurer] proposes . . .” and “. . .
any loss caused to the interior of the house by rain in conjunction with the
127 Id.
128 Id. at 289.
129 See, e.g., Arnold v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 688 N.W.2d 708, 719 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004); see
also Eckstein v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 455, 462 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
130 Arnold, 688 N.W.2d 708.
131 Id. at 712–13.
132 Id. at 713.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 715.
135 Id. at 719.
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damaged caulking is an ensuing loss, and there is no exception or exclusion in
the policy for loss caused by rain.”136
Similarly, in Eckstein v. Cincinnati Insurance Company, the United States
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky rejected the argument that
coverage for a loss is preserved by an ensuing loss clause only when a covered
peril causes a loss that is “separate” from a loss caused by an excluded peril.137
In Eckstein, the policyholder’s home became uninhabitable due to toxic mold
contamination.138 Faulty construction of the house allowed water into the
house, which, in turn, resulted in the toxic mold contamination.139
The policies at issue contained exclusions for both mold and faulty work-
manship.140 The policies also contained ensuing loss clauses that provided:
“[A]ny ensuing loss to property . . . not excluded or excepted in this policy is
covered.”141
Not surprisingly, the insurer argued the mold contamination was excluded
from coverage under the mold and faulty workmanship exclusions.142 The poli-
cyholder, on the other hand, argued the mold contamination was covered
because it ensued from water damage, a covered peril, even though an excluded
peril—faulty construction—allowed the water to enter the house.143
In explaining its decision, the court first discussed the rules of policy
interpretation:
“Interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law” that the Court reviews de
novo. In undertaking review, the Court must keep in mind that a “contract should be
liberally construed” and that all doubts must be “resolved in favor of the insureds.”
Also, all “exceptions and exclusions should be strictly construed” for the efficacy of
insurance. “Under the ‘doctrine of reasonable expectations,’ an insured is entitled to
all the coverage he may reasonably expect to be provided according to the terms of
the policy.”144
The court then applied these rules of policy interpretation to the ensuing
loss clause and rejected the argument that the loss must ensue from a “separate”
covered peril in order to be covered:
The Court finds that case law and the dictionary definition of ensue supports the
[policyholder’s] argument. There is nothing in the policies to indicate that an ensuing
loss must be the result of a separate cause from the excluded loss. To the contrary,
the policies are clear that faulty construction losses are excluded, but losses taking
place afterward, or as a result of faulty construction, are covered. . . . Such an inter-
pretation is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the insureds.145
136 Id.
137 Eckstein v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 2d 455, 462 (W.D. Ky. 2007).
138 Id. at 457–58.
139 Id. at 458.
140 Id. at 461.
141 Id.
142 Id. at 462.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 461 (quoting K.M.R. v. Foremost Ins. Grp., 171 S.W.3d 751, 753 (Ky. Ct. App.
2005); and quoting Hendrix v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 823 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Ky. Ct. App.
1991)).
145 Id. at 462.
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Finally, the court rejected the insurer’s argument that, even if the mold
contamination was caused, in part, by the covered peril of water intrusion, the
mold exclusion nonetheless should still apply, stating:
Water can damage a structure in a variety of ways. Typically, water causes
damage to a structure by way of rot, decay, mold, and deterioration. . . . The Court
adopts the rationale of the cases cited by the [policyholder] which hold that rot and
mold is not excluded when it is the result of an otherwise covered event. . . . “[T]he
loss that followed the water damage was caused by water damage.” It was not caused
by mold damage. The policies here exclude loss caused by mold, rot, decay, etc. The
policies do not exclude loss which is mold, rot, decay and the like. The mold exclu-
sion would preclude coverage for mold occurring naturally or resulting from a non-
covered event. But when mold ensues from water damage which is covered under the
policy, the mold damage is covered despite the exclusion.146
In sum, although there are some cases in which the courts have incorpo-
rated a “separate and intervening” cause test into the ensuing loss clause, there
also are several cases in which the courts have rejected such tests, and instead,
they have held a loss is covered so long as a covered peril played a role in
causing the loss.147
IV. THE FLAWS OF THE VARIOUS APPROACHES COURTS HAVE USED TO
INTERPRET AND APPLY THE ENSUING LOSS CLAUSE
A. Problems with the “Efficient Proximate Cause” Test
As is discussed above, some courts have approached the ensuing loss
clause analysis by attempting to determine whether the “efficient proximate
cause” of a loss is a covered or an excluded peril.148 Under this approach, if the
initial event in a causation chain of events that leads to a loss is covered, then
coverage for the claim is preserved by the ensuing loss clause even if excluded
perils play a role in causing the loss.149 Courts that have employed this
approach have gone terribly astray for at least eight reasons.
First, applying the “efficient proximate cause” test to the ensuing loss
clause is completely inconsistent with the rules of insurance policy interpreta-
tion. There is no language—ambiguous or unambiguous—in the ensuing loss
clause that supports interpreting the clause to be an entré into the “efficient
proximate cause” test. The courts that have done so have simply ignored the
rules of policy interpretation and constructed their own standard that is com-
pletely divorced from the policy language and insurance law.150 Further, to the
extent the language is ambiguous, rules of policy interpretation—contra profer-
entem, the reasonable expectations doctrine, and construction of the policy as a
whole—dictate that the ambiguities should be construed in favor of coverage
146 Id. at 462–63 (quoting Home Ins. Co. v. McClain, No. 05-97-01479-CV, 2000 WL
144115, at * 4 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2000) and citing Flores v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s Co.,
278 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Tex. 2003)).
147 See supra Part III.C and notes 103–04.
148 See supra Part III.A.
149 See supra Part III.A.
150 See cases cited supra in note 56.
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instead of in a way that creates an additional tort causation standard for the
policyholder to satisfy in order to recover.151
Indeed, more than sixty years ago in his dissent in Standard Oil Company
of New Jersey v. United States,152 Justice Frankfurter cogently explained why
incorporating tort causation principles into contractual insurance disputes is
inappropriate:
Unlike obligations flowing from duties imposed upon people willy-nilly, an
insurance policy is a voluntary undertaking by which obligations are voluntarily
assumed. Therefore the subtleties and sophistries of tort liability for negligence are
not to be applied in construing the covenants of a policy. It is one thing for the law to
impose liability by its own notions of responsibility, and quite another to construe the
scope of engagements brought and paid for. . . . The law does not play an unreal
metaphysical game of trying to find a single isolatable factor as the sole responsibil-
ity to which is to be attributed a loss against which insurance has been bought. As a
matter of experience and reason such losses are invariably the resultant of a combina-
tion of factors.153
To amplify one of Justice Frankfurter’s points, insurance policies are “volun-
tary [contractual] undertakings” drafted by insurers, who are well compensated
for assuming the risks of loss of their policyholders through the receipt of pre-
miums and substantial investment income that is earned from premiums
between the time premiums are received and claims are paid.154 Consequently,
it is inappropriate and unnecessary for courts to create an additional burden for
policyholders to satisfy in order to recover by incorporating tort concepts such
as “efficient proximate cause” into policies, particularly when the insurers
themselves did not do so when they drafted the policy language.
Similarly, more than eighty years ago in Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad
Company,155 Judge Andrews recognized that the idea that a single cause in a
causation chain of events is the “proximate cause” of an accident is a fiction:
These two words have never been given an inclusive definition. What is a cause
in a legal sense, still more what is a proximate cause, depend[s] in each case upon
many considerations . . . . Any philosophical doctrine of causation does not help
us. . . . You may speak of a chain, or, if you please, a net.156 An analogy is of little
aid. Each cause brings about future events. Without each the future would not be the
151 See supra Part II.
152 Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54 (1950).
153 Id. at 66 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
154 See, e.g., Eliot Martin Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and
Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY L.J. 401, 422–23 (1988) (“Insurers do
not simply hang onto premiums, of course; they invest them for the time period between
payment of premiums and payment of losses. . . . The role of investment income in the
[insurance] industry is particularly important. Studies have concluded that investment
income allows the industry to remain profitable as a whole even with significant negative
underwriting losses.”).
155 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
156 Judge Andrews is referring to this well-known quote of Lord Shaw:
To treat proxima causa as the cause which is nearest in time is out of the question. Causes
are spoken of as if they were as distinct from one another as beads in a row or links in a chain,
but—if this metaphysical topic has to be referred to—it is not wholly so. The chain of causation
is a handy expression, but the figure is inadequate. Causation is not a chain, but a net. At each
point influences, forces, events, precedent and simultaneous, meet; and the radiation from each
point extends infinitely. At the point where these various influences meet it is for the judgment
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same. Each is proximate in the sense it is essential. But that is not what we mean by
the word. Nor[,] on the other hand[,] do we mean sole cause. There is no such thing.
. . . .
. . . What we . . . mean by the word “proximate” is that, because of convenience,
[because] of public policy, [because] of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily
declines to trace a series of events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is
practical politics. . . .
. . . .
. . . It is all a question of expediency. There are no fixed rules to govern our
judgment. . . . This is rather rhetoric than law. There is[,] in truth[,] little to guide us
other than common sense.157
Even insurers have acknowledged that there is not a single “cause” of a
loss. Michael Bragg, assistant counsel at State Farm Insurance Companies,
wrote the following in 1985:
[E]very event has an infinite number of causes; and second, each cause can be
described in an infinite variety of ways. Although these statements are beyond seri-
ous philosophic challenge, they seem far removed from the practical considerations
faced daily by policy drafters, underwriters, and claims persons. The demanding
careers of such professionals leave little time to ponder Aristotle’s or Bacon’s notion
of causation. . . .
. . . .
. . . Property insurance, unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with establish-
ing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liability. Thus, we discover that: “proxi-
mate cause has a different meaning in insurance cases than it has in tort cases. In tort
cases the rules of proximate cause are applied for the single purpose of fixing culpa-
bility, and for that reason the rules reach back of both the injury and the physical
cause to fix the blame on those who created the situation in which the physical laws
of nature operated; in insurance cases the concern is not with the question of culpa-
bility or why the injury occurred, but only with the nature of the injury and how it
happened.”158
. . . .
. . . Thus, the “cause” of loss in the context of a property insurance contract is
totally different from that in a liability policy. This distinction is critical to the resolu-
tion of losses involving multiple causes.159
In short, the idea that there is a single cause of a loss is a fiction and tort
causation principles should not be applied to property loss claims.
as upon a matter of fact to declare which of the causes thus joined at the point of effect was the
proximate and which was the remote cause.
. . . The cause which is truly proximate is that which is proximate in efficiency. That effi-
ciency may have been preserved although other causes may meantime have sprung up which
have yet not destroyed it, or truly impaired it, and it may culminate in a result of which it still
remains the real efficient cause to which the event can be ascribed.
Lanasa Fruit S.S. & Importing Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 302 U.S. 556, 562–63 (1938)
(quoting Lord Shaw in Leyland Shipping Co. v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc’y, [1918] A.C.
350, 368–71 (House of Lords)).
157 Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103–04 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
158 Michael E. Bragg, Concurrent Causation and the Art of Policy Drafting: New Perils for
Property Insurers, 20 FORUM 385, 385–86 (1985) (quoting 43 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 463
(2d ed. 1982)).
159 Id. at 387.
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Second, applying the “efficient proximate cause” test to the ensuing loss
clause is inconsistent with the original purpose of the clause.160 The ensuing
loss clause originally was created to ensure that a loss is covered if it was
caused at least in part by a covered peril.161 Indeed, the clause was created to
avoid the application of tests such as the efficient proximate cause test to insur-
ance claims.162
Third, although insurers have drafted anti-concurrent causation exclusions
that insurance claims handlers often cite when denying coverage in concurrent
causation situations,163 many policies with anti-concurrent causation exclusions
also contain an ensuing loss clause.164 Thus, the correct interpretation and
application of such language cannot be to simply apply the anti-concurrent cau-
sation exclusion and ignore the ensuing loss clause. To the contrary, the ensu-
ing loss clause is intended to address situations where a loss is caused, at least
in part, by a covered peril. Thus, when the ensuing loss clause is ignored, a key
part of the policy is impermissibly rendered superfluous.165 Instead of ignoring
the ensuing loss clause due to its conflict with anti-concurrent causation exclu-
sions, the rules of policy interpretation dictate that, in circumstances where a
policy contains inconsistent terms that render the policy language ambiguous,
the court should resolve the ambiguities in favor of the policyholder.166
Fourth, courts cannot even agree on when or how to apply an “efficient
proximate cause” test in insurance cases.167 Although not in the context of the
ensuing loss clause, courts in numerous states have used some version of “effi-
cient proximate cause” in insurance cases while courts in numerous other states
have either rejected it or declined to enforce policy provisions that arguably
give rise to it.168 This lack of consensus by the courts only leads to confusion
and uncertainty by policyholders and insurers alike regarding the concept and
how it works.
160 See supra Introduction for a discussion of the genesis of the ensuing loss clause.
161 See supra Introduction for a discussion of the genesis of the ensuing loss clause.
162 See supra Introduction for a discussion of the genesis of the ensuing loss clause.
163 See, e.g., David P. Rossmiller, Interpretation and Enforcement of Anti-Concurrent Pol-
icy Language in Hurricane Katrina Cases and Beyond, in NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE:
CURRENT CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW 43, 79 (2007).
164 For example, the policy language quoted above in Part I, in Blaine Construction Corp.,
contains an anti-concurrent causation clause and an ensuing loss clause. Blaine Constr. Corp.
v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1999).
165 As is discussed above, one of the rules of policy interpretation is that all provisions of
the policy should be given effect if possible. See Part II.C.
166 See supra Part II.A.
167 See Lavitt, supra note 57, at 16; see also 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 16,
§ 101:43 (“The concept of proximate cause is as ubiquitous in insurance law as it is in tort
law. Courts have failed to reach a consensus on the concept definition of proximate cause.”).
168 See Lavitt, supra note 57, at 16–17; see also Mark D. Wuerfel & Mark Koop, “Efficient
Proximate Causation” in the Context of Property Insurance Claims, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 400,
405–07 (1998) (listing states that have adopted or rejected efficient proximate causation in
insurance cases); Randall L. Smith & Fred A. Simpson, Causation in Insurance Law, 48 S.
TEX. L. REV. 305, 366 (2006) (noting that Florida and Texas have not adopted efficient
proximate cause in insurance cases); Julie A. Passa, Comment, Property Insurance: Adopt-
ing the Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine, But Saying No to Contracting Out of It, 79 N.D.
L. REV. 561, 572 (2003) (noting that “California and Washington preclude parties from
contracting out of the efficient proximate cause doctrine”).
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Fifth, when courts incorporate an “efficient proximate cause” test into the
ensuing loss clause, they mistakenly have acted as though they need to fill
some gap in the policy language because the policy language fails to address
the situation at issue. Take, for example, situations such as Hurricane Katrina’s
destruction of homes by multiple causes—wind (a covered peril) and tidal
surge (an excluded peril)169—but the policy language at issue apparently did
not contain an ensuing loss clause or other policy language that dictated
whether the loss was covered. Judicially created standards to address concur-
rent causation claims are only defensible when the policy does not contain an
ensuing loss clause that addresses how a loss that is concurrently caused by a
covered peril and an excluded peril should be handled.170 Unlike such cases,
where an ensuing loss clause is present there is no policy language gap for the
courts to fill because the ensuing loss clause dictates the outcome. Indeed, the
ensuing loss clause dictates how the dispute should be resolved in such cases,
and the courts do not need to wade into the briar patch of attempting to fill a
void created by the absence of applicable policy language.
Sixth, applying tort concepts such as “efficient proximate cause” to insur-
ance cases, which are contract disputes, is inappropriate. Tort causation is a
fault-based inquiry designed to assign blame.171 In insurance law, on the other
hand, fault should not be part of the contractual coverage analysis.172 Instead,
in insurance cases, one should only look at the causation issue to determine
whether or not the policy at issue covers the loss.173 It is a question of contract,
not of fault.174 Indeed, whether insurance covers a loss is not a question of
169 One commentator has attempted to explain the different scenarios in which the concept
of “concurrent causation” may be invoked versus the concept of “efficient proximate cause.”
According to the commentator, unlike situations where a causation chain of events that
involves both covered and excluded perils results in a loss (e.g., situations in which the
ensuing loss clause may be implicated and in which some courts may be tempted to apply
the “efficient proximate cause” test in determining whether the loss is covered), “concurrent
causation” arises in situations where “two events of independent origin combine to cause a
loss that would not have occurred unless both events had taken place.” 3 NEW APPLEMAN
INSURANCE LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 16, at § 31.06[4][c][i] (citing Luneau v. Peer-
less Ins. Co., 750 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Vt. 2000) (“The doctrine of concurrent causa-
tion . . . requires two independent risks, one of which is excluded by the policy and one of
which is included.”)). Other commentators may not agree with this alleged distinction. See,
e.g., Erik S. Knutsen, Confusion About Causation in Insurance: Solutions for Catastrophic
Losses, 61 ALA. L. REV. 957, 962 (2010); Lavitt, supra note 57, at 6.
170 Numerous law review articles have been written regarding Hurricane Katrina and con-
current causation. See, e.g., Knutsen, supra note 169 at 959; Lavitt, supra note 57, at 1.
171 See, e.g., Knutsen, supra note 169, at 968–69.
172 See Banks McDowell, Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV. 569,
576–77 (1988); Knutsen, supra note 169, at 969.
173 Professor Malcolm Clarke similarly has argued that the causation inquiry should be lim-
ited by the language actually used in the insuring agreement or exclusions. Professor Clarke
bases his argument on the fact that insurance causation is a purely contractual inquiry. Thus,
the only causes in play should be those mentioned in the contract of insurance. See MAL-
COLM CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY 184 (2005).
174 See Knutsen, supra note 169, at 969; see also STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS,
supra note 18, § 7.01, at 7–6; McDowell, supra note 172, at 576–77.
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morality or blameworthiness.175 Insurance policies do not contain any language
requiring or allowing for the determination of whether a loss is covered to turn
on whether there was a breach of a standard of care by someone.176 Thus, using
tort concepts to decide coverage issues transforms what should be a contractual
analysis into a fault analysis.
Seventh, using a tort standard177 such as the “efficient proximate cause”
test to decide insurance coverage questions leads to inconsistent and unpredict-
able results.178 Under such a test, when a judge or jury is forced to choose a
single event in a causal chain of events that started the causal chain of events
that led to the loss,179 the fact finder implicitly is invited to conduct an inquiry
into a “justice”-based outcome that affects the predictability of the result.180
Indeed, using such malleable tests has led to demonstrably inconsistent results
over time in cases with similar fact patterns.181
175 Professor Jeffrey W. Stempel similarly has noted that, unlike insurance causation, tort
causation “tends to encompass socially imposed regulation of relationships.” See STEMPEL
ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 18, § 7.01, at 7–6.
176 Courts that have applied tort concepts to property insurance claims likely have done so
because, unlike the property insurance context, in the liability insurance context, the underly-
ing liability of the policyholder is determined by applying causation tests such as the effi-
cient proximate cause test. See, e.g., Rossmiller, supra note 163, at 62; see also Garvey v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal. 1989) (“ ‘Liability and corresponding
coverage under a third-party insurance policy must be carefully distinguished from the cov-
erage analysis applied in a first-party property contract. Property insurance, unlike liability
insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort liabil-
ity.’ ”) (quoting Bragg, supra note 158, at 386). Thus, courts mistakenly have transferred tort
concepts and rules from the liability insurance context to property insurance cases.
177 For decades, law review articles have been written regarding the unpredictable results
that flow from tort standards like the “efficient proximate cause test.” Leon Green, Foresee-
ability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1408 (1961); see Gerald Dworkin, Risk
and Remoteness—Causation Worse Confounded, 27 MOD. L. REV. 344, 344 (1964); John
C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1315, 1315
(2003); Richard W. Wright, Once More Into the Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution,
and the Extent of Legal Responsibility, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1071, 1072 (2001); see also Jane
Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean by “Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 433, 433
(2008).
178 See, e.g., Knutsen, supra note 169, at 971; Michael J. Trebilcock, The Role of Insurance
Considerations in the Choice of Efficient Civil Liability Rules, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 258
(1988) (arguing that using such an approach is a “random form of judicially administered
wealth redistribution”); see also CLARKE, supra note 173, at 185–87; ROBERT H. JERRY, II &
DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 560–66, 578–80 (4th ed. 2007);
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 18, § 7.02, at 7-10–7-18; Lavitt, supra note
57, at 32–33; Richard A. Fierce, Insurance Law—Concurrent Causation: Examination of
Alternative Approaches, 10 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527, 545 (1985).
179 Other commentators are also critical of using the efficient proximate cause test in the
insurance context. See CLARKE, supra note 173, at 185–87 (trying to choose a single cause
leads to unpredictable and inconsistent results and too much “judging”); JERRY & RICH-
MOND, supra note 178, at 560–66, 578–80; STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note
18, § 7.02, at 7-10–7-18; Fierce, supra note 178, at 545 (asserting that any approach leading
to predictable results is better than the unpredictable “hocus-pocus” of the efficient proxi-
mate cause test); Lavitt, supra note 57, at 1 (arguing against the efficient proximate cause
test approach because it produces different results in different jurisdictions).
180 See Knutsen, supra note 169, at 974.
181 Compare, e.g., Duensing v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 131 P.3d 127, 135–37 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2005) (finding the “earth movement” exclusion clause ambiguous and inapplica-
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Finally, the uncertainty associated with using tort causation tests in insur-
ance disputes increases the costs of litigation because it makes it harder to settle
such cases. Settlements are largely driven by the parties being able to predict
the outcome of the dispute.182 If the outcome is not predictable, then the likeli-
hood of the parties finding the common ground necessary to settle is
reduced.183 The failure to settle, in turn, increases the amount of time the judge
and the parties must spend on the case.184 It also increases the amount of time
such cases remain on a court’s docket.185 In short, using standards that con-
sume greater amounts of the courts’ and parties’ resources yet result in incon-
sistent and unpredictable outcomes is costly and inefficient.
For these reasons and others, one law professor colorfully advocated that
the “efficient proximate cause” test be eliminated from insurance coverage
disputes:
The “doctrine of efficient proximate cause” is a misshapen organism that inched out
of [an] old swamp, bearing several vestigial appendages of causation theory that
should have fallen into desuetude long ago. The time has come to recognize the
dégringolade of the Doctrine. There is no persuasive logical or compelling reason to
retain it.186
In paler words, the “efficient proximate cause” test simply has no place in
insurance coverage disputes because the resolution of such disputes should be
based upon (1) contract terms and (2) the well-established rules that govern
how the contract terms should be interpreted. The contract terms and rules gov-
erning their interpretation can resolve insurance disputes without the incorpora-
tion of malleable and unpredictable tort concepts into insurance contracts.
B. Problems with the “Separate and Intervening Cause” Test
In insurance cases, the “separate and intervening cause” test suffers from
many of the same problems as the “efficient proximate cause” test. As an initial
ble where the dominant cause of loss was erosion of soil under a house), with Davis-Travis
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 336 F. App’x 770, 774 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding the “earth
movement” exclusion clause unambiguous and applicable where the dominant cause of loss
was movement of soil under a house). See also Lavitt, supra note 57, at 17 (“The Doctrine is
anything but economically ‘efficient.’ Nationwide irregularity created by a patchwork of
conflicting and confused state precedents grows more and more complex, as courts and
juries unpredictably select from competing conditions the most important single reason for a
loss.”).
182 Cf. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 60 (1996) (“The trials that occur, nonetheless,
are primarily in cases in which the parties remain so far apart in their predictions of the
decision on liability that they are willing to gamble on a jury’s notoriously unpredictable
verdict.”).
183 Id.
184 Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 J.
DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (1991) (“[I]f . . . a plaintiff values a case too high or the defendant too low,
settlement becomes difficult or impossible. At a minimum, this prolongs negotiations and
unnecessarily consumes the parties’ and lawyers’ time and resources. At worst, matters that
should have been settled proceed to trial, placing heavy burdens on the court system and the
parties.”).
185 Id.
186 Lavitt, supra note 57, at 62–63.
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matter, like the “efficient proximate cause” test, the “separate and intervening
cause” test is completely inconsistent with the purpose of the ensuing loss
clause, which is to eliminate causation disputes and to ensure that losses caused
at least in part by a covered peril remain covered even if an excluded peril
played a role in causing the loss.187
Further, the “separate and intervening cause” test is not based upon policy
language. The words “separate and intervening” do not appear in the ensuing
loss clause.188 Consequently, like the “efficient proximate cause” test, the “sep-
arate and intervening cause” test is a legal construct of the courts rather than a
contractual mandate of the terms of policies. Rather than mandating the crea-
tion of new tests or hurdles for policyholders to clear in order to get coverage
when policy language is vague, the rules of policy interpretation dictate that the
ambiguities should be resolved in favor of the policyholder.189 The rules of
policy interpretation also dictate that the reasonable expectations of the policy-
holder regarding the coverage the policyholder expects to receive when buying
a policy should be fulfilled and that the terms of the policy should be construed
as a whole with the purpose of the insurance in mind.190 In short, the creation
by courts of the “separate and intervening cause” test, when policy language
does not support such a test, violates the rules of policy interpretation.
Moreover, the “separate and intervening cause” test, like the “efficient
proximate cause” test, invites a metaphysical debate regarding which event in a
chain of events caused a loss and whether a covered peril occurred before or
after an excluded peril.191 For example, in the Roberts192 case discussed above,
the bees in the attic of the house created the honey that seeped into the ceiling
of the dining room and caused damage.193 Damage caused by insects such as
bees was excluded from coverage.194 Was the seeping honey from the bees a
“separate and intervening” cause of the loss that was different from the damage
caused by the excluded peril (i.e., the bees)? It arguably was not “separate”
because the bees created the honey. Was the seeping honey an “intervening”
cause of the loss? Arguably, it was not. It was simply one step in the causation
chain that commenced when the bees started creating a hive. Yet, in order for
the court to find coverage for the claim, the court in essence held that the honey
damage was a separate, covered loss simply because the bees were gone by the
time the damage caused by the honey manifested.195 Thus, the court resorted to
metaphysics in order to conclude the loss was somehow separate from the bees.
In addition, as noted by a California court, allowing insurers to deny cov-
erage for any losses in which the loss was caused in part by an excluded peril
that occurred subsequent to a covered peril “would be giving insurance compa-
nies carte blanche to deny coverage in nearly all cases.”196 Indeed, because
187 See supra Part III.C.
188 See cases cited supra in notes 56, 80, and 103.
189 See supra Part II.A.
190 See supra Part II.B–C.
191 See supra notes 156–58.
192 Roberts v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 705 P.2d 1335 (Ariz. 1985).
193 Id. at 1336.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 1337.
196 Howell v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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nearly all losses have multiple causes and causation tests are so malleable,
allowing insurers to deny coverage any time an excluded peril occurred later in
the causation chain of events or any time an excluded peril contributed in some
small way to causing the loss would impermissibly make insurance illusory in
many instances.197
Another problem caused by applying the “separate and intervening cause”
test in insurance cases is that the test makes outcomes much more unpredict-
able. If the outcome of a dispute is unpredictable, then what are the chances
that the policyholder or the insurer can accurately predict how a court or jury
will decide the case? Two of the primary purposes of contracts are to allow the
parties to understand their respective obligations and to predict the results in the
event of a breach by one of the parties.198
Because the malleability of the “separate and intervening cause” test, like
the “efficient proximate cause” test, makes the results of its application unpre-
dictable, cases in which either of those two tests is used are less likely to set-
tle.199 The failure of cases to settle where the facts are not really in dispute
creates inefficiencies in the legal system because the cases proceed through
discovery, motion practice, and trial at great expense to the parties, courts, and
jurors.200 For example, it is costly for the parties to debate causation under the
“separate and intervening” test because they typically need to retain experts
who have dueling opinions, which will be the subject of discovery and then
trial. Such cases also create an incentive for the parties and experts to create
factual disputes regarding causation even though the facts themselves may not
be in dispute because the policyholder must identify a “separate and interven-
ing” cause of the loss that is covered under the policy, while the insurer must
argue to the contrary. This creation of a factual dispute regarding causation, in
turn, makes it unlikely that the trial court will be able to resolve the case on a
197 See supra notes 42, 52 and 181 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ & DENISE RIEBE, CONTRACTS: A CONTEXT AND
PRACTICE CASEBOOK 5 (2009) (“[P]redictability promotes our free market economy by pro-
viding certainty for those involved in exchanging goods and services. If a merchant knows
the legal consequences of her negotiating efforts or of the language she selects for her con-
tracts, she can act accordingly. This predictability encourages people to enter into contracts,
secure in the knowledge that those contracts will be enforced.”); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of
Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 751
(2000) (“Long-term contracts raise a straightforward, but seemingly intractable problem: in
the long term events are so hard to predict, that parties will not be able to allocate future
obligations and payments in a way that maximizes the value of their contract.”).
199 See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
200 See Ehrheart v. Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Settlement agree-
ments are to be encouraged because they promote the amicable resolution of disputes and
lighten the increasing load of litigation faced by the federal courts. In addition to the conser-
vation of judicial resources, the parties may also gain significantly from avoiding the costs
and risks of a lengthy and complex trial.”) (internal citation omitted); Murchison v. Grand
Cypress Hotel Corp., 13 F.3d 1483, 1486 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We favor and encourage settle-
ments in order to conserve judicial resources.”); see also Miller v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 155 P.3d 1278, 1281 (Mont. 2007) (“The declared public policy of this State is to
encourage settlement and avoid unnecessary litigation. . . . Settlement eliminates cost, stress,
and waste of judicial resources.”).
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motion for summary judgment.201 Consequently, causation tests like the “sepa-
rate and intervening cause” test and “efficient proximate cause” test force the
parties to trial, which as noted above, is inefficient.
In short, if a standard such as the “separate and intervening cause” test is
used, then the parties are compelled to debate metaphysical causation issues,
which results in the creation of factual disputes, which, in turn, results in the
dispute being tried because the trial court cannot dispose of a case in which
there are material facts in dispute.202 In addition to creating inefficiencies in the
legal system, the “separate and intervening cause” test is premised upon the
fiction that losses are caused by a single peril or that the causes of the loss can
be neatly segregated.203 Thus, the “separate and intervening cause” test suffers
from many of the same flaws and inefficiencies as the “efficient proximate
cause test.”
C. Problems with Attempting to Apportion the Loss Between Covered and
Excluded Perils
A third option for concurrent causation cases that has been proposed by
Professor Knutsen and other legal scholars is to apportion the loss between
covered and excluded causes of the loss.204 Such a proposal, however, fails to
consider the ensuing loss clause. Although apportionment may have some
atmospheric appeal due to the perception that it is a “fair” solution (i.e., neither
the insurer nor the policyholder bears the entire loss), apportionment is not
consistent with the purpose of the ensuing loss clause, the language in the ensu-
ing loss clause, the rules of policy interpretation, or the purpose of insurance
(i.e., the transfer of a risk of loss from the policyholder to an insurer).
As is discussed above, the ensuing loss clause was created to ensure that
losses caused at least in part by a covered peril are covered even if an excluded
peril also played a role in causing the loss.205 Thus, one of the very purposes of
the ensuing clause when it originally was created was to clarify that apportion-
ment between covered and excluded perils is neither required nor appropriate
because the entire loss is covered.
Further, nowhere in the ensuing loss clause is “apportionment” mentioned.
Because the question being answered is a question of contractual interpreta-
tion,206 the answer ultimately should be based upon the policy language, not a
201 See Alabama v. North Carolina, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2308 (2010) (“[S]ummary judgment is
appropriate where there ‘is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and the moving party is
‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) and citing Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986))); Montgomery v. Barrow, 692 S.E.2d 351, 353
(Ga. 2010) (“[T]he moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
warrant judgment as a matter of law.”); UT Med. Grp. v. Vogt, 235 S.W.3d 110, 119 (Tenn.
2007) (“[A] grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when (1) there is no genuine
issue with regard to the material facts . . . and (2) based on undisputed facts, ‘the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ”) (quoting TENN. R. CIV. P. 56.04).
202 See cases cited supra note 201.
203 See supra notes 156–57, 159, and 161 and accompanying text.
204 See, e.g., Knutsen, supra note 169, at 1010-12.
205 See supra Introduction.
206 See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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court’s or jury’s sense of fairness. Thus, because apportionment is not
grounded in the policy language, it cannot be the correct way to resolve dis-
putes regarding the meaning of contract language.
Apportionment also would be inefficient to apply in practice because, as
discussed above regarding the problems with the “separate and intervening
cause” and “efficient proximate cause” tests, it often is difficult to segregate the
different causes of a loss in a causation chain of events.207 For example, in the
hypothetical leaking roof scenario discussed in the Introduction, what percent-
age of the damage to the floors and walls is due to the faulty installation of the
roof versus the rain? Even if more facts were provided, the question likely
cannot be answered in an intellectually honest way because there would be no
damage in the absence of either the rain or the faulty installation of the roof.
Consequently, if the loss were to be apportioned between covered and excluded
causes, the parties would need to hire experts to debate how many covered
versus excluded causes of the loss occurred and the amount of the loss that
should be attributed to each such cause, just as they would under the “separate
and intervening cause” test. This would lead to unnecessary litigation expenses
and, most likely, an arbitrary result.208
In addition, because such a debate essentially is a factual dispute regarding
the amount of recoverable damages, most courts would be unable or unwilling
to resolve such disputes through summary judgment motions practice.209 For
the same reasons, the likelihood that the parties would be able to settle would
decrease because each party would have trouble properly predicting the out-
come of the causation debate.210 Thus, apportionment suffers from many of the
same problems as the “efficient proximate cause” and “separate and intervening
cause” tests and would lead to inefficiencies in the resolution of disputes and
increase the costs of the parties, courts and jurors.
V. A PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF THE ENSUING LOSS CLAUSE THAT NOT
ONLY IS BASED UPON THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE CLAUSE
AND THE RULES OF POLICY INTERPRETATION BUT ALSO
PROVIDES CONSISTENT, PREDICTABLE
RESULTS AND THE EFFICIENT RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES
Having discussed the problems with apportionment and the two leading
causation tests that some courts have used when interpreting and applying
ensuing loss clauses, is there a better way? Yes. Simply stated, the original
purpose of the ensuing loss clause, the policy language in the clause, and the
existing rules of policy interpretation all dictate that if a covered peril plays any
role in the causation chain of events that leads to a loss, then the loss should be
covered regardless of whether the policy contains an anti-concurrent causation
exclusion. Such a result not only is dictated by the rules of policy interpretation
and the fact that insurers are well compensated for assuming the risk of their
207 See discussion supra Parts IV.A–B.
208 See supra notes 177–81, 198–201 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 182–185 and accompanying text.
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policyholders’ losses,211 but also should lead to consistent and predictable out-
comes and the efficient resolution of claims.212
A. The Original Purpose of the Clause and Application of the Rules of
Policy Interpretation to the Policy Language
There should be little debate that ensuing loss clauses are, at best, ambigu-
ous. Consider again the language of a common ensuing loss clause: “This pol-
icy does not insure loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by any Peril
excluded. . . . [U]nless loss or damage from an insured Peril ensues and then
only for such ensuing loss or damage.”213
As an initial matter, the phrase “ensuing loss” is not defined. Not surpris-
ingly, because it is undefined, courts have interpreted the term inconsis-
tently.214 This point alone supports an argument that the clause is
ambiguous.215 Nonetheless, when policy terms are not defined, courts often
turn to dictionaries to understand the common meaning of the terms.216 One
common dictionary, the American Heritage Dictionary, defines the term
“ensue” as: “1. To follow as a result. 2. To take place subsequently.”217 Both of
these definitions refer to a sequence of events, with the emphasis on one event
following another event. Thus, under a literal application of the dictionary defi-
nition of the term “ensue” used in the ensuing loss clause, a loss is covered so
211 See supra note 154.
212 In recent years, some commentators have opined that because policies contain standard-
ized language drafted by insurers, when policy language is interpreted courts should keep in
mind that policies are risk-spreading instruments that are necessary to society and should be
viewed as akin to private statutes, products, or “things” rather than as only non-negotiated
contracts. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV.
203, 205–06 (2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and
Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489, 1491, 1495 (2010); Jeffrey W. Stempel,
The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813, 816 (2009); see also
Schwarcz, supra note 49, at 1397–98. Although this Article does not rely upon such non-
traditional approaches to interpreting and applying the ensuing loss clause, it is notable that
these non-traditional ways of interpreting policy language, which would examine the origins
of the ensuing loss clause and the purpose of insurance generally (i.e., the transfer of risk
from policyholders to insurers), support the interpretation of the clause and conclusion set
forth in this Article. See discussion supra Part III.C.
213 Blaine Constr. Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 171 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir. 1999). See also
cases cited supra notes 56, 80, and 103.
214 See supra notes 56, 80, and 103 and accompanying text.
215 When policy terms are undefined and courts have reached conflicting results regarding
the meaning of the policy language, common sense suggests the policy language is ambigu-
ous. See supra Part II.A.
216 See N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v. Corr. Med. Servs., 527 F.3d 1033, 1041 (10th Cir.
2008) (“To ascertain the ordinary meaning of [an undefined term in an insurance policy],
Missouri courts often refer to the standard dictionary definition.”); Valley Forge Ins. Co. v.
Swiderski Elecs., 860 N.E.2d 307, 316 (Ill. 2006) (noting that where policies do not define a
term, the court will look to the dictionary definition of the term to afford it its plain, ordinary
and popular meaning); Telecomms. Network Design v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 5 A.3d 331,
335 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (“Words of common usage in an insurance policy are to be con-
strued in their natural, plain, and ordinary sense, and we may inform our understanding of
these terms by considering their dictionary definitions.”).
217 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 467 (4th ed. 2004) (internal cross ref-
erence omitted).
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long as it “follows” as a consequence of a covered peril. Whether or not an
excluded peril is also part of the causation chain of events that leads to the loss
is simply irrelevant. Such an interpretation is certainly reasonable, which is all
that a policyholder must show in order for its interpretation to prevail.218
Putting aside the interpretation of the clause offered above, the internal
inconsistency in the “ensuing loss” clause also demonstrates the clause’s ambi-
guity. The anti-concurrent causation exclusionary language in the clause ini-
tially says a loss is excluded if it is caused “directly or indirectly” by an
excluded peril. One could argue that the words “directly or indirectly” mean
that any loss caused in part by an excluded peril is not covered. Yet, later in the
clause, it says there is coverage if a loss ensues from a covered peril. The Fifth
Circuit aptly described this contradictory ambiguity in the ensuing loss clause
in the Lake Charles case as “self-contradictory gibberish.”219 The court then
noted “the insurers’ initial argument that the exclusion is plain and unambigu-
ous is unconvincing.”220
The fact that the anti-concurrent causation language purports to take cov-
erage away for any loss caused directly or indirectly by an excluded peril, but
then the ensuing loss clause reinstates coverage in the same breath if a loss
ensues from a covered peril, makes the provision internally inconsistent and
thus, ambiguous. Under contra proferentem, courts should resolve this ambigu-
ity in favor of the policyholder.221
Construing the ambiguities in anti-concurrent causation exclusions that
contain an ensuing loss clause in favor of the policyholder does not include
creating or incorporating tort causation tests such as the “efficient proximate
cause” or the “separate and intervening cause” test into the policy. Instead of
resolving ambiguities in favor of the policyholder, those tests create an addi-
tional hurdle for policyholders. Resolving the ambiguities in anti-concurrent
causation exclusions that contain an ensuing loss clause in favor of the policy-
holder means the policyholder should only need to prove that the loss ensued
from (i.e., followed) a covered peril in order to recover under the policy regard-
less of whether excluded perils also may have been in the causation chain.
Stated differently, unless a loss is caused solely by excluded perils, the loss
should be covered.
Similarly, the “reasonable expectations” doctrine also dictates that the
ensuing loss clause should be interpreted broadly in favor of coverage.222 The
primary reason a policyholder buys “all risk” property or homeowners insur-
ance is to obtain broad protection against losses. Indeed, “all risk” policies, by
name and purpose, cover all types of damages and losses except for losses
expressly excluded.223 Consequently, a homeowner who purchases an “all risk”
policy reasonably expects that it will be covered for nearly all types of damages
and losses. Because losses are often caused by many perils—excluded perils
218 See supra Part II.B.
219 Lake Charles Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co., 857 F.2d 286,
288 (5th Cir. 1988).
220 Id.
221 See supra Part II.A.
222 See supra Section II.B.
223 See supra note 16.
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and covered perils—to interpret the ensuing loss clause narrowly would allow
the anti-concurrent causation exclusion to swallow the “all risk” coverage and
would impermissibly render the coverage provided illusory.224 Thus, if an
insurer intends to carve out coverage for some risks, then, as the drafter of the
policy language, the insurer needs to make sure it does so clearly and unam-
biguously.225 As commonly worded, anti-concurrent causation exclusions that
contain an ensuing loss clause fail to do so.
Further, the doctrine that requires interpretation of the provisions in “all
risk” property and homeowners policies as a whole, instead of in parts, also
favors a broad reading of ensuing loss clauses. Indeed, ensuing loss clauses
would be essentially meaningless if any loss caused in part by an excluded peril
was not covered simply because the excluded cause of loss (1) started the cau-
sation chain of events that resulted in the loss (under the “efficient proximate
cause” test set forth in McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company)226
or (2) occurred just prior to the damage (under the “separate and intervening
cause” test set forth in Weeks v. Co-Operative Insurance Companies).227 “All
risk” policies are intended to provide the broadest available transfer of risk
from the policyholder to the insurer.228 Ensuing loss clauses reinforce that “all
risk” policies are intended to cover all risks unless the perils causing the loss
are (1) expressly excluded and (2) the only causes of the loss. Thus, interpret-
ing the ensuing loss clause to mean that coverage is provided for an otherwise
excluded loss if a covered peril plays a role in causing the loss is consistent
with the purpose of “all risk” policies for which the insurers did, after all,
receive a premium.
Finally, this interpretation is also consistent with the original intent and
purpose of the clause when it was created. The ensuing loss clause was origi-
nally created to ensure that losses that resulted from fires (a covered peril)
following earthquakes (an excluded peril), remained covered despite an anti-
concurrent causation exclusion.229 Thus, the ensuing loss clause was intended
to make clear that losses that ensue from covered perils are covered even if
excluded perils are also involved in the causation chain of events that led to the
loss.
B. Public Policy Considerations
Public policy also favors interpreting the ensuing loss clause to provide
coverage for an otherwise excluded loss if a covered peril plays a role in caus-
ing the loss. As an initial matter, no obvious public policy considerations favor
interpreting the ensuing loss clause narrowly so as to preclude coverage for
otherwise covered losses. Nor do insurer concerns such as adverse selection230
224 See supra notes 42, 52, and accompanying text.
225 See supra note 18.
226 McDonald v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 837 P.2d 1000, 1004 (Wash. 1992).
227 Weeks v. Coop. Ins. Cos., 817 A.2d 292, 296 (N.H. 2003).
228 See supra note 16.
229 See supra Introduction.
230 Adverse selection in the insurance context is “the disproportionate tendency of those
who are more likely to suffer losses to seek insurance against those losses.” Kenneth S.
Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward
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or moral hazard231 come into play in typical ensuing loss cases. There is no
empirical evidence that suggests that policyholders purchase policies that con-
tain ensuing loss clauses in order to avoid anti-concurrent causation exclusions.
Indeed, most policyholders do not even read their policies or know what spe-
cific provisions are contained in them.232
On the other hand, public policy favors the enforcement of contracts, such
as insurance policies, in accordance with their terms and the rules of insurance
policy interpretation.233 Indeed, as one court correctly noted, “[t]here is more
than one public policy. One such policy is that an insurance company which
accepts a premium for covering all liability for damages should honor its obli-
gation.”234 Because insurers draft the language contained in their policies, they
can simply state in the insurance policies, in clear terms, the specific types of
claims that are not covered, particularly when one considers that the policy-
holder who purchases “all risk” insurance is buying coverage for “all risks”
except those expressly excluded.235 If the insurer fails to do that, as they have
in the context of the ensuing loss clause, then public policy favors enforcing the
a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 102 n.82
(1993); see also MARK S. DORFMAN, INTRODUCTION TO RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE
95 (8th ed. 2005) (describing the difficulty underwriters have in determining the risk of
insuring persons more likely to suffer a loss than other insureds paying the average rate);
EMMETT J. VAUGHAN & THERESE M. VAUGHAN, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE: A RISK MAN-
AGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 25 (1995) (noting how adverse selection accumulates bad risks,
which disrupts underwriters’ predictions about future losses).
231 Moral hazard is the tendency of a policyholder to take fewer precautions when insured.
See Adam F. Scales, The Chicken and the Egg: Kenneth S. Abraham’s “The Liability Cen-
tury,” 94 VA. L. REV. 1259, 1263 (2008) (reviewing KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY
CENTURY: INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11 (2008)) (“Moral
hazard is the tendency to take fewer precautions in the presence of insurance. Adverse selec-
tion is the tendency of riskier people to gravitate towards unsuspecting insurance pools,
eventually raising premium rates and causing less risky people to exit. A great deal of insurer
behavior is designed to combat, or at least manage, these problems.”) (citing ABRAHAM,
supra, at 45–48). Another commentator defines related “moral hazard” as when “[a] person
who deliberately causes a loss . . . [or] exaggerates the size of a claim to defraud an insurer.”
See DORFMAN, supra note 230, at 480.
232 See, e.g., KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 47, § 6.3, at 634.
233 Sch. Dist. for the City of Royal Oak v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 912 F.2d 844, 848–49 (6th Cir.
1990) (explaining that public policy favors enforcing the terms of insurance policies and
“common sense suggests that the prospect of escalating insurance costs and the trauma of
litigation, to say nothing of the risk of uninsurable punitive damages, would normally neu-
tralize any stimulative tendency the insurance might have.”). See Nw. Nat’l Cas. Co. v.
McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 444 (5th Cir. 1962) (Gewin, J., concurring) (noting the public policy
favoring the enforcement of contracts); Union Camp Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 452 F. Supp.
565, 568 (S.D. Ga. 1978) (“Exercise of the freedom of contract is not lightly to be interfered
with. It is only in clear cases that contracts will be held void as against public policy.”).
234 Creech v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 516 So. 2d 1168, 1174 (La. Ct. App. 1987).
235 See Royal Oak, 912 F.2d at 849 (“Had the company wished to exclude coverage for
intentional religious discrimination in employment, it could and should have said so.”);
Univ. of Ill. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 599 N.E.2d 1338, 1350–51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (“[T]he
insurer is an informed contracting party with no inferiority in bargaining position and should
not be allowed to escape from the contract it freely entered into. . . . This court will not
rewrite [a] policy to create an exclusion.”); Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 697 v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 863, 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“The carrier is, of course, free
to expressly provide an exclusion for such conduct in the future.”).
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terms of the policy in favor of coverage.236 To do otherwise would create a risk
that policyholders could lose the reasonably expected coverage they bought, an
expectation of coverage that is consistent with the original purpose of the ensu-
ing loss clause and insurance generally.
In short, public policy dictates requiring insurers to honor the contracts
they enter.237 Insurers draft the “all risk” property and “all risk” homeowners
policies in which the anti-concurrent causation exclusions and ensuing loss
clauses appear. If insurers do not want to cover certain types of losses, then the
policies should clearly state such losses are not covered. The rules of insurance
policy interpretation dictate that the anti-concurrent causation exclusion should
be interpreted narrowly while the ensuing loss clause should be interpreted
broadly. Thus, if courts follow these rules, as public policy requires, then losses
caused in part by a covered peril should be covered.238
C. Consistent and Predictable Outcomes
Interpreting the ensuing loss clause to preserve coverage for otherwise
excluded losses where a covered peril plays a role in causing the loss also
should lead to consistent and predictable results. Although insurers may be
required to pay claims that they would otherwise choose to litigate under an
apportionment standard or the “efficient proximate cause” and “separate and
intervening cause” tests, the outcome of disputes in which an insurer chooses to
contest the payment of a claim under this proposed interpretation should be
fairly predictable because the dispute would be decided under a bright-line rule
that favors a finding of coverage. Consequently, insurers would be incentivized
not to litigate claims they likely would lose; insurers would want to avoid
incurring wasteful litigation costs.
In addition to reducing the incentive to litigate, this predictability in the
outcome of disputes would be beneficial to insurers because it would allow
them to reserve for claims more accurately and to establish with more certainty
the amount of premiums needed to cover claims and be profitable.239 Thus, this
predictability should result in cost savings for insurers, policyholders, and
courts as fewer cases are litigated and tried.
D. Efficient Resolution of Claims
Interpreting the ensuing loss clause to provide coverage for an otherwise
excluded loss if a covered peril plays a role in causing the loss also should lead
to the efficient resolution of claims. By creating a bright-line rule such as the
236 See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 18 and 38.
238 See supra notes 18 and 38.
239 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Lindsey Morden Claims Servs., Inc., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 799, 802
(Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“Insurance is a highly uncertain and risky endeavor, because it requires
accurate predictions about the occurrence and cost of future events. Insurers are able to
define and limit the risks, and to set premium levels commensurate with the risks, using
complex and nuanced contracts (policies).”); Nancy R. Page, Comment, Risky Business:
Consumer Protection in the Insurance Industry, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 287, 291 (1986)
(“Predicting claims and pooling risks is the business of insurance. When accurate prediction
is no longer possible, some liability markets become theoretically too risky for insurance.”).
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one proposed in this Article, the parties should not need to retain experts to
engage in metaphysical debates regarding which cause in the causation chain of
events was the “initial” cause or whether a “separate and intervening” covered
peril that occurred after an excluded peril resulted in a loss. Nor should the
courts and parties need to conduct trials regarding the amount of the loss that
should be apportioned among the various causes of the loss. Further, to the
extent the parties cannot agree on whether a covered peril played a role in
causing the loss, the court in many instances nonetheless should be able to
resolve the dispute through summary judgment because, assuming the facts are
not in dispute, resolution of the dispute should be a question of law—the appli-
cation of the court’s interpretation of the policy language to the facts of the
case.240 Thus, fewer trials should be needed, and, in many cases, the parties
should be able to settle without retaining experts or even involving the courts.
CONCLUSION
In recent years, parties have overlooked the ensuing loss clause when ana-
lyzing coverage for losses caused by multiple perils when the policy at issue
contains an anti-concurrent causation exclusion. Moreover, even when the
clause has been considered, many courts have misunderstood and misapplied
the clause. The courts’ difficulties in applying the clause are due principally to
the courts’ failure to understand the origins of the clause and incorrect applica-
tion of the rules of policy interpretation to the clause. Instead of applying the
rules of policy interpretation to the clause, some courts have incorporated tort
causation concepts such as the “efficient proximate cause” test or the “separate
and intervening cause” test into the clause.241 In doing so, such courts have
turned what should be a contractual analysis into a fault analysis that is not
based upon policy language.242 Further, by applying highly malleable tort cau-
sation tests to the ensuing loss clause, the results in such cases have been incon-
sistent and unpredictable.243 Inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes in
insurance disputes lead to inefficiencies in the legal system because it is harder
to settle cases that have inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes, which in turn
increases the parties’ and courts’ litigation costs.244
Applying the well-established rules of policy interpretation such as contra
proferentem to the ensuing loss clause, as well as public policy considerations,
leads to the conclusion that any loss that results, at least in part, from a non-
excluded peril is covered regardless of whether an excluded peril also played a
240 See Private Bank & Trust Co. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 409 F.3d 814, 816 (7th Cir.
2005) (“We are presented with a question of insurance policy interpretation, which is a
question of law . . . .”); In re Frederick Petroleum Corp., 912 F.2d 850, 852 (6th Cir. 1990)
(noting that a question of policy interpretation is a question of law); Penzer v. Transp. Ins.
Co., 29 So. 3d 1000, 1005 (Fla. 2010) (“This case presents a question of insurance policy
interpretation, which is a question of law . . . .”); Farmers Home Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank
of Pocahontas, 129 S.W.3d 832, 835 (Ark. 2003) (“Whether the policy language is ambigu-
ous is a question of law to be resolved by the court.”).
241 See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
242 See supra Parts IV.A–B.
243 See supra Parts IV.A–B.
244 See supra Parts IV.B.
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role in causing the loss. The term “ensuing loss” is not defined in the clause,
and the anti-concurrent causation exclusionary language is internally inconsis-
tent with the ensuing loss clause language. One part of the provision says that
losses caused “directly or indirectly” by certain perils are excluded from cover-
age, but another part of the clause says that if a loss nonetheless “ensues,” then
the loss is covered. Under the doctrine of contra proferentem, these inconsis-
tencies and ambiguities should be construed in favor of the policyholder.245
Such an interpretation is also consistent with the original intent of the
clause and the rules of policy interpretation that provide that (1) policies should
be construed as a whole with the purpose of the insurance in mind, and (2) the
policyholder’s reasonable expectations should be fulfilled.246 “All risk” prop-
erty and homeowners policies cover all risks of loss except those losses caused
by perils that are expressly listed in the policies.247 Thus, a policyholder who
purchases the broadest coverage available reasonably expects the coverage pro-
vided by the policy will be very broad. The policyholder also reasonably
expects to not be required to hire experts to engage in a philosophical debate
regarding which cause in a chain of events was the most important, or last,
cause that led to a loss when it seeks coverage for the loss.
Finally, adopting this interpretation should also lead to more predictable
and consistent outcomes in insurance disputes that involve the ensuing loss
clause because it creates a bright-line standard for the parties and courts to
apply. Under this interpretation, courts should be able to efficiently resolve
such disputes as a matter of law in most instances without the need for juries to
attempt to determine which peril was the most important in causing the loss or
whether the loss can be segregated or apportioned among separate perils.248
This predictability also should make insurance claim disputes easier to settle,
which, in turn, should reduce the parties’ and courts’ litigation costs.249 In
short, simply applying the well-established rules of policy interpretation to the
ensuing loss clause, instead of tort causation concepts and standards, should
lead to more predictable and consistent outcomes and the efficient resolution of
disputes that involve the ensuing loss clause.
245 See supra Part II.A.
246 See supra Part II.B.
247 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
248 See supra Parts V.C–D.
249 See supra Parts V.C–D.
